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Abstract

Joint Vision 2020, the Department of Defense (DoD) blueprint for development
and transformation, identifies information and technology as critical enablers for our
nation’s military and calls for the development of a joint force capable of integrated
information sharing to provide decision superiority, the ability to make and implement
better decisions before enemies can react (DoD, 2000). Networks have been identified as
the single most important element for transforming our current military forces.
Ironically, Air Force base-level communications networks have been identified as a
weakness.
This research follows the qualitative approach to increases the current
understanding of base level communications networks by conducting a multiple site
comparative case study that includes practitioner interviews at four locations and the
examination of existing literature and documented trip reports. This study determines if
base- level networks are disparate, isolates sources of disparity, identifies advantages and
disadvantages of disparity, and recommends an appropriate course of action.
This research is significant for members of the Air Force, DoD, and private
citizens. Air Force networks support close to three-quarters of a million users, including
active duty service members, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard, civilians, and
embedded contract employees (McCarter, 2003). In addition to potentially affecting
many people and the larger DoD network, base-level networks provide support to
deployed warfighters and provide the environment to train, organize and equip our forces.
Additionally, these networks provide critical information to key decision makers.
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EXPLORATORY INQUIRY: DISPARATE AIR FORCE BASE AREA
NETWORK ARCHITECTURES

I. Introduction

Joint Vision 2020, the Department of Defense (DoD) blueprint for development
and transformation, identifies information and technology as critical enablers for our
nation’s military. Currently, these key enablers provide a tremendous advantage over our
adversaries and must be cultivated, protected, and employed effectively in the future
(DoD, 2000). Joint Vision 2020 calls for the development of a joint force capable of
integrated information sharing to provide decision superiority, the ability to make and
implement better decisions before enemies can react (DoD, 2000). The synergy gained
by the interdependence of the Services makes it clear that jointness is more than the
simple combination of Service capabilities (DoD, 2000:42). The following comment by
the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, supports the guidance found in Joint
Vision 2020 and highlights the importance of networks:
“Possibly the single most transforming thing in our forces will not be a weapons
system, but a set of interconnections and a substantially enhanced capability because of
that awareness” (DISA, 2004).
In order to provide the environment for decision superiority, Joint Vision 2020
requires the development of a Global Information Grid (GIG); a globally interconnected,
end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for
collecting processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to
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warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel (DoD 2000). According to Mr. Rob
Thomas, the Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration,
existing network architectures require transformation to provide warfighters with a
globally integrated battle-space (Thomas, 2004). Effective integration within the Air
Force and across joint operating mission areas necessitates abandoning traditional
barriers to take advantage of new technological capabilities (Thomas, 2004). To achieve
decision superiority, DoD systems must be interoperable, supportable, and exchange
relevant information in a timely manner (DoD, 2004a:23). An August 2002 Secretary of
the Air Force policy memo tagged architectures as the “key construct in visualizing
mission information relationships and promoting interoperability” (Cabrera, 2004). To
summarize, Joint Vision 2020 provides a roadmap for the development of a joint force
capable of sharing information and integrated operations beyond the simple combination
of capabilities (DoD, 2002). A GIG will provide the information environment required
by the joint force and outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Establishment of a GIG requires
transformation of existing network architectures. The DoD and the individual services
are currently taking action to increase interoperability and achieve optimal integration as
outlined in Joint Vision 2020, the DoD blueprint for development and transformation
(USSTRATCOM, 2004). This study examines Air Force installation-level networks that
contribute greatly to DoD interoperability and integration.
Installation-level wide area and local area networks, WANs and LANs
respectively, represent the lowest Air Force portion of the GIG and are critical to joint
force interoperability and integration (Brewin, 1997). The services cannot support the
DoD blueprint for development and transformation without addressing installation-level
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networks (Brewin, 1997). Although the two previous citations are a few years old, the
researcher believes these sentiments are still true today. This research study explores
these Air Force installation-level or base area network (BAN) architectures, referred to as
BANs throughout this study. In the context of this research study, the following
definition defines a BAN:
“The BAN provides interconnectivity within and between systems and networks
in the defined campus area. The BAN also provides access for the attached systems and
networks to external networks, such as Non-classified Internet Protocol (IP) Network
(NIPRNET), Secret IP Network (SIPRNET), and the Internet” (AFCA, 2002).
In this research study, the defined campus area is the area serviced by the local
communications organization on a typical Air Force Base and identifies the BAN
coverage area. The campus area or BAN includes transmission facilities; switching and
routing components; links from the backbone to buildings; interfaces to external and
internal networks; and the components required to provide voice, data, and imaging
(AFCA, 2002).
In 1997, the Air Force program executive for battle management labeled
installation-level networks or BANs as the service’s “Achilles’ heel” and promoted Air
Force plans to establish standard BANs (Brewin, 1997). This study investigates whether
BANs are still the service’s “Achilles heel”. Specifically, this study explores whether
BANs are different throughout the Air Force, reasons for existing differences, and
advantages and disadvantages of disparate networks.
This research study follows a qualitative approach using a comparative multiple
site case study and focused interviews to identify patterns and increase understanding
concerning BANs. Information is verified through triangulation, the researcher’s values
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and bias are reported, and the nature of the research is exploratory. The qualitative
approach is appropriate for exploratory research efforts that report the researcher’s values
and biases (Creswell, 1994).
Background
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires the Department of Defense to establish
and maintain sound and integrated information technology architectures (US Congress,
1996). Additionally, the nature of military engagement has changed; future wars will be
fought with coalitions in a joint service environment (DoD, 2000). Unilateral operations
are a thing of the past. The Clinger-Cohen Act mandate and a change in the nature of
military engagements acknowledge the importance of the key enablers, information and
technology, mentioned in the introduction. Achieving the DOD goal of increased
interoperability and integration by exploiting these key enablers fully requires each
military service to ensure their respective service-level networks are interoperable and
integrated (USSTRATCOM, 2004). Air Force BANs are a key component of the Air
Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) and provide a vehicle for mission information
exchange between key functional areas supported by an Air Force Base. Figure 1 reflects
common BAN connections. The figure shows a high-level example, but is not intended
to show a complete set of connections supported by all BANs (AFCA, 2002).
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Figure 1, Base Area Network High-level Operational Concept (AFCA, 2002)

Air Force BANs evolved over the years from simple disjointed networks into
intricate and essential components of a critical weapons system, the AFEN (DoAF,
2004). These networks provide the critical link between users, information, and
technology in support of Air Force and joint operations (DoAF, 2004:4). Accordingly,
BANs directly affect our ability to fly, fight, and win (Williams, 2004). The Combat
Information Transport System (CITS) program effectively standardized the way
individual bases connect to the larger AFEN; chapter II covers this program in more
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detail. However, BANs should receive more attention and focus because a loss of service
for BAN users could result in mission failure at home or abroad. A briefing provided to
senior Air Force leaders in the communications field reflected the standardization of
regional control centers, but failed to address installation-level networks (Bruns, 2004).
According to a former director of the Defense Information Systems Agency
shared, for far too long people just thought of BANs as plumbing, but they are critical
part of the Defense Information Infrastructure (Brewin, 1997). The researcher has
encountered Air Force IT leaders that believe standardized BANs are critical to success,
and others who believe BAN standardization holds less significance. Base Area
Networks are a vitally important element of enhancing combat strength through the
synergy created by joining the strengths of individual components (AFCA, 2003).
The researcher has also encountered many IT leaders that believe unique mission
requirements or local factors require the development of specialized systems. This line of
thinking is outdated and does not support Joint Doctrine requiring increased
interoperability and integration. In order to transform doctrine into operational
capabilities, leaders must select synergy over specialization to achieve optimal effects.
Solutions based on commercial open-systems technology should replace legacy systems
whenever possible. This study provides solutions and insight while recognizing the
divergent environments and actions dictated by various missions, procurement strategies,
and development histories present at bases throughout the Air Force.
Research Significance
This research is significant for members of the Air Force, DoD, and private
citizens. Air Force networks support close to three-quarters of a million users, including
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active duty service members, Air Force Reserves, Air National Guard, civilians, and
embedded contract employees (McCarter, 2003). Currently, the Air Force has 108
connections into the DoD network enterprise (AFCA, 2004:10). In addition to potentially
affecting many people and the larger DoD network, BANs provide support to deployed
warfighters and provide the environment to train, organize and equip our forces. Today’s
operating concepts require deployed personnel to obtain logistic and administrative
support from home, referred to as reachback capability, and deployed locations (DoD,
2003:1). The term “battlespace” describes an environment where far removed
participants and individuals on the battlefield both help shape the battlefield (AFCA,
2003:7). The battlespace construct recognizes the synergy achieved by reachback and
distributed operations to increase situational awareness, flexibility, and speed of
execution (AFCA, 2003:6). Warfighters, regardless of their location, must be able to
obtain and use intelligence from national and theater assets that may be widely dispersed
(DoD, 2003). The kill chain (find, fix, track, target, engage, and asses) is where networks
as a weapons system can be most effective (Williams, 2004). illustrates the kill chain and
the enhancements provided by the GIG. Base area networks play a pivotal role in
executing the Air Force mission. Base area networks provide critical voice, data, video,
sensory, and imagery to decision makers (CITS, 2004). In light of the facts mentioned in
this paragraph, increased understanding and the development of BANs are very important
and served as the catalyst for this research project.
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Figure 2, Kill Chain

According to former Secretary of the Air Force, James Roche, “We must preserve
and enhance our ability to get and use quality, timely, actionable information to shorten
the kill chain.” (Williams, 2004) The United States of America is the only superpower in
the world, but our nation is still vulnerable to threats now and in the future (DoD, 2000).
Few adversaries will take on the United States military directly; however, they will
attempt to offset our military superiority by exploiting information and technological
vulnerabilities (AFCA, 2003). Future success against enemies and discovering new
capabilities depends heavily on our ability to share information and conduct integrated
operations. BANs provide a critical link between warfighters, technology, and the
information required for mission accomplishment. The Air Force estimates $5 billion in
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network upgrades are required to implement Joint Vision 2020 capabilities
(USAF/XORI, 2004). Failing to manage base level resources effectively forfeits
technological advances implemented at the Department of Defense, Air Force, and Major
Command levels.
This comparative multiple site case study, with accompanying focused interviews,
provides benefits by uncovering and qualitatively validating valuable patterns and
insights from the field. Reviewing pertinent literature combined with the comparative
multiple site case study results will increase the existing body of knowledge and provide
a foundation for additional research. The Department of Defense, Air Force
Communications Agency (AFCA), Major Commands, Commanders, and individual
service members will benefit from an increased understanding of BANs. Specifically,
Air Force infrastructure architects and planners will benefit from this research.
The timing of this research is very significant. In the summer of 2004, the Air
Force Communications Agency transitioned the SCOPE Network mission to SCOPE
EDGE. The transition replaced a preventative maintenance and fine-tuning mission
involving visits to every Air Force Base every 18 to 24 months with a new mission
focused on achieving a consistent, sustainable, and cost-effective communications
medium to support a seamless information grid (SCOPE EDGE, 2004). Does the new
focus remove a critical helping hand for base-level maintainers? Will the new SCOPE
EDGE mission be as successful as SCOPE Network? Will the mission change have
detrimental consequences? Time will reveal the answers to these questions; this research
provides a peek into BANs at this important juncture.
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Research Questions
The research objectives are to increase existing knowledge on the phenomenon of
disparate Air Force BANs and to determine if the Air Force should standardize BANs, if
the results reflect that BANs are indeed disparate. This research provides insight and a
foundation for leaders and managers to make BAN and AFEN related decisions. To
satisfy the research objectives, Chapter IV presents an analysis and discussion of the
following investigative questions:
1. Are BANs different throughout the Air Force? If so, how?
2. Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force?
3. What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force?
4. What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force?
5. How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs?

Research Propositions
This study addresses the following research propositions according to the research
model illustrated in Figure 3:
1. Research will show BANs are different throughout the Air Force
2. Research will identify sources of disparate Air Force BANs.
3. Research will show advantages and disadvantages of disparate Air Force
BANs.
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Research Model

Variable

Advantages
of Variability
Why

AF
Response

BANs?
Disadvantages
of Variability
Figure 3. Research Model

Scope and Limitations
The focus of this research study is Air Force base area networks (BANs) and
whether the Air Force should take action to standardize these networks. Deployable
communications architectures are not covered. The research objectives are to increase
understanding and to elevate the importance of BANs; the critical interfaces between
warfighters, everyday users, and critical information required to accomplish the mission.
Specific equipment specifications and technologies are not explored, unless
required to support the main research focus. This research does not explore other
military branches because their command structures and methods of addressing
information technology depart greatly from the Air Force. The other branches,
commercial organizations, and government nonmilitary agencies present opportunities
for additional research.
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Thesis Overview
This thesis is presented in five chapters followed by appendices and references.
The current chapter introduces the research topic, provides background information,
identifies the significance of the research, and highlights the scope and limitations of the
research. Chapter II provides and outline of the current Air Force information technology
infrastructure and summarizes theoretical perspectives and previous research findings in a
clearly defined literature review. Chapter II also reviews existing literature and presents
an overview of the CITS program and guidance from the Department of Defense and the
Air Force. Definitions, models, and research on related topics are included in the
literature review. Chapter III outlines the methodology. This chapter describes how a
multiple site comparative case study analysis with focused interviews is used in data
collection and analysis. Next, the results are analyzed in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter
V features a discussion of the research results, itemizes the conclusions, promotes
recommendations, and identifies areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review

Overview
This literature review examines existing literature relevant to the scarcely
researched topic of Air Force BANs. The paramount goal of this chapter is to expand
understanding provide a common frame of reference for this exploratory inquiry into the
Air Force BANs. Very little literature exists concerning base or installation level
communications networks. Accordingly, this chapter presents literature pertaining to the
larger Air Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) and the base level networks; changes to the
AFEN also affect the BANs. To accomplish the chapter goal, this literature review is
divided into four main sections. First, the AFEN network architecture is described.
Second, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Strategic Visions 2010, and 2020 are reviewed.
Third, organizations that influence the AFEN structure are presented. Fourth, other
AFEN and BAN relevant topics, not fitting into the three previous sections, are covered.
Air Force Enterprise Network Architecture
Overview
This section describes the structure and management components of the Air Force
Enterprise Network. First, a description of Air Force Base Area Networks (BANs) is
presented. Next, trust relationships and Windows NT domain models are discussed.
Then, the structure of the AFEN is outlined, followed by a discussion of the three
management levels. Finally, the Air Force network operations command relationship is
provided. The goal of this section is to inform and establish a common understanding of
the Air Force Enterprise Network Architecture.
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Air Force Base Area Networks
Deployed communications architectures are outside the scope of this study.
However, it is important to note that fixed base communications networks provide critical
home base support for deployed warfighters. Home base networks also provide the
environment to train, organize and equip information technology professionals prior to
deployments. Home networks if properly configured and maintained prepare our airman
to successfully support warfighting operations in all arenas.
Over 95 percent of voice, video, and data capabilities used by the Air Force to
make force management and deployment decisions rely on cable, wireless, and fiber
systems for intra-base network connectivity and information transfer. However, the
existing infostructure is insufficient to support the current and future requirements for
integrated voice, data, video, imagery, and sensory information data transmission to
operators, planners, and support personnel (USAF/XORI, 2004). Local communications
networks; providing voice, data, video, etc.; for non-deployed locations throughout the
Air Force are referred to by the following names: Base Information Transport System
(BITS), Information Transport System (ITS), and Base Area Network (BAN). This
research study primarily uses BAN to describe these installation-level networks.
Regardless of the name used, it is important to understand what constitutes a BAN. Base
area networks consist of the components, systems, and equipment that provide
communications services for the local installation; it includes transmission systems, voice
networks, data networks, building wiring, network interfaces, video services, and the base
Network Control Center (NCC); the focal point for management of the local network, see
Figure 4, Base Area Network. The illustration shows a typical configuration. The local
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missions, environmental factors, and past history dictate configurations of BANs. An Air
Force briefing for senior leaders in 2003, described BANs as independent architectures
and a smorgasbord of hardware (AETC, 2003). Many of the systems that make up BANs
are highly segregated preventing the desired level of interoperability. The rapid
evolution of computing power and networks has contributed to current state of BANs.
The updated version of Moore’s Law, named after the co-founder of Intel and originally
observed in 1965, states that computing power doubles every 18 months and will
continue to do so for at least the next two decades (Intel, 2004). Individual BANs come
together to form the Air Force Enterprise Network, an Air Force-wide information
environment.

Figure 4, Base Area Network
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Trust Relationships and Windows NT Domain Models
A Windows NT domain organizes the resources from one or more servers into a
single administrative composition (Locher, 1999). Windows NT provides login
privileges to the domain rather than to individual servers and Domain Administrators
grant users access to a domain's resources (Locher, 1999). Organizations may choose to
establish multiple domains because the number of users or workstations is too large,
departments need to manage their own resources, or the number of servers on a single
domain is too large and effecting performance (Locher, 1999). Trust relationships
between domains allow administrators to manage multiple domains as a single
administrative entity and only require users to login to a single domain (Locher, 1999).
The next four sections outline the four existing Windows NT domain models: Single,
Single Master, Multiple Master, and Complete Trust.
Single Domain Model
This model has a single domain with accounts and resources; provides advantages
of centralized management of accounts and resources, does not involve any trust
relationships and works best for small organizations (Windows, 2004). Disadvantages
are performance problems as the domain grows, lack of internal security divisions for
units or divisions to reflect segments of a growing enterprise, and maximum of 40,000
accounts (Windows, 2004).
Single Master Domain Model
This model has a single account domain and multiple resource domains; provides
advantages of departmental resource control based on resource domains, centralized
account management, global groups (to many multiple accounts) are defined centrally in
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account domain, and provides good solution for moderately sized networks (Windows,
2004). The number of trust relationships is based on the number of resource domains. In
order for this model to work well, account domain administrators must assign global
groups to manage resource security; resource domain administrators should assign
permissions to groups, not individuals; and number of accounts can not exceed 40,000
(Windows, 2004).
Multiple Master Domain Model
This model is an extension of the single master model; provides the following
advantages: accommodates any number of accounts by adding additional account
domains, resources are locally and logically grouped to provide departmental-focused
management, any master domain is capable of managing accounts, and provides a good
solution for very large organizations (Windows, 2004). The disadvantage is the
complexity associated with the additional number of account domains and trust
relationships (Windows, 2004).
Single Master Domain Model
This model is a decentralized, high overhead environment consisting of a set of
single domains with trusts relationships between each domain; advantages are scaleable
for any number of users, each entity has full control over accounts and resources located
in the same domain, and very useful for organizations without a Management
Information Systems department (Windows, 2004). The disadvantages are lack of
centralized management, many trust relationships and associated complexity, and
administrators must trust each other to manage accounts, resources, and privileges
(Windows, 2004).
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A single model described above or a combination of the models can be employed
to manage networks (Locher, 1999). Table 1 provides a summary of the Window NT
domain models.
Table 1, Domain Model Summary

Domain Model

Maximum
Accounts
40,000
Single
40,000
Master
Unlimited
Multiple Master
Complete Trust

Unlimited

Account
Management
Centralized
Centralized
Centralized in
Account Domains
Decentralized

Resource
Management
Centralized
Decentralized
Decentralized

Trusts
No
Yes
Yes

Decentralized

Yes

Fixed base BANs are the focus of this research study, deployable communications
architectures are outside the scope of this study. The BANs provide fixed base
communications services and represent a significant part of the Defense Information
Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DII COE), a plug and play, client server
architecture that defines interfaces and how system components will interact. The DII
COE is fully compliant with DOD standards and guidance (AFCA, 1996). Figure 5, Air
Force’s System Domains (AFCA, 1996), shows how the services BANs provide for fixed
base communications relate to other domains of the DII COE.
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Airborne
Communications

Space

DII COE
Fixed Base
Communications

Deployed

Figure 5, Air Force’s System Domains (AFCA, 1996)

The purpose of the DII COE is to field systems with increasing interoperability
and operational capability while reducing development time and life cycle cost. The DII
COE was developed in late 1993 and designed to eliminate design incompatibility among
DOD systems (Carnegie, 2004).
Air Force Enterprise Network
The Air Force Enterprise Network (AFEN) is the Air Force-wide information
environment that operates in a global context and is comprised of interoperable
computing and communicating components that provide processing; information storage,
dissemination, assurance, and transport; human interaction; and network management.
The AFEN consist of all owned and leased communications and computing systems,
software, and services; data; and security services required to accomplish the Air Force
mission. The AFEN encompasses 130 separate bases (Hoeft, 2004). Figure 6, depicts
the target architecture for the AFEN and how it fits into the larger DoD architecture. As
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mentioned in Chapter I, the Air Force has 108 connections to the DoD enterprise network
(AFCA, 2004:10).

Joint

DoD
GIG

Other
Networks
(e.g.
Internet)

AF
Boundary

MAJCOM
Boundary

Primary
AFNOSC

Primary
NOSC

Air Force
Network

MAJCOM
Network

COOP

COOP

Base
Boundary

GSU
Boundary

Primary
NCC

Base
Network

GSU

COOP
(if present)

WAN

ITS

Figure 6, Target Architecture

The AFEN is a part of the Global Information Grid (GIG), an information
environment supporting the DoD, national security organizations, and intelligence
community. AFEN users, designers, and technicians must follow accepted standards
whenever feasible to foster interoperability, assure mission success, commonality, and
reduce cost of ownership (DoAF, 2000). The lowest level of the AFEN and the focus of
this research study is the Air Force installation-level network architecture or BAN
(DoAF, 2004:4).
Successful Network Operations (NETOPS) provide effective, efficient, secure,
and reliable information network services used in vital DOD and Air Force
communications and information processes. The Air Force NETOPS hierarchy is used to
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manage the AFEN; this hierarchy adheres to the Defense Information Infrastructure
Control Concept, a three tier DoD NETOPS hierarchy. Within the Air Force NETOPS
hierarchy, all three tiers are represented, as shown in Table 2. Air Force NETOPS
Hierarchy.

Within the DoD NETOPS hierarchy, the Air Force only has a presence at

the regional and local tiers. The Defense Information Systems Agency, global tier of
DoD NETOPS hierarchy, has overarching responsibility for the military services and
other DoD components, as reflected in Table 3. DoD NETOPS Hierarchy. Successful
management of the AFEN through NETOPS provides high quality service to customers
and satisfies increasing warfighter demands. The paragraphs below Table 2 and Table 3
discuss the three levels of the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy.
Table 2. Air Force NETOPS Hierarchy

NETOPS Level

Responsible Air Force Organization

Global (Tier 1)

Air Force Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC)

Regional (Tier 2)

Major Command (MAJCOM) NOSC

Local (Tier 3)

Network Control Center

Table 3. DoD NETOPS Hierarchy

NETOPS Level

Responsible Organization

Global (Tier 1)

DISA Global NOSC (GNOSC)

Regional (Tier 2)

MAJCOM NOSC, AFNOSC, other service and component NOSCs

Local (Tier 3)

Network Control Center
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Network Control Center
The Network Control Center (NCC) represents the local level of Network
Operations management within the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy, tier 3. The NCC is the
focal point for operation, maintenance, and management of all aspects of the BAN
including Local Area Networks (LANs) and Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs) on a
particular base. The NCC provides support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Personnel
assigned to the NCC provide an on-site technical capability for network modifications
and restorations of faulty equipment and circuits when directed by higher level Network
Operations and Security Centers (NOSC).
Prior to 2004, management of the AFEN was centered on base NCCs because the
majority of supported systems were independently installed and created fragmented lines
communications (DoAF, 1999). NCCs provided the local network management expertise
to offset the inherent obstacles associated with early networks. Today, to provide
effective, efficient, secure, and reliable information network services, management of the
AFEN has evolved to the three network operations management tiers reflected in table 1.
The explosive growth and increasing interconnectivity of networks and information
systems making up the AFEN resulted in the change in management focus.
Major Command Network Operations and Security Center
A Major Command (MAJCOM) is a major subdivision of the Air Force. Each
MAJCOM has a specific portion of the Air Force mission and is directly subordinate to
Headquarters United States Air Force. The Air Force is organized by MAJCOM
functionally in the United States and geographically overseas (DoAF, 2003). MAJCOM
Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSC) represent the regional or mid-level
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organization in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy, tier 2. The MAJCOM NOSC provides
real-time network intrusion detection, perimeter defense capabilities, and fault resolution
activities. Additionally, MAJCOM NOSC personnel monitor and support the daily
operational issues of subordinate bases and units within their command.
If this study determines that BANs throughout the Air Force are disparate, NOSC
personnel will be particularly interested because disparate networks could lead to
extended outages and loss of service due to unfamiliarity with various base architectures.
Changing the focus for network management and troubleshooting from the NCC to the
NOSC creates gaps between troubleshooters and the location of the outage, potentially
preventing outage resolution. Several independent studies report that over 80 percent of
information technology system downtime is due to processes and people, not technology
(Mossing, 2004). This presents a difficult challenge for NOSC personnel attempting to
guide local NCC personnel during the resolution of an outage caused by people or
processes. Geographic separation may hinder restoration efforts.
Air Force Network Operations and Security Center
The AFNOSC is the highest Air Force NETOPS level, tier 1 or global level. In
the DoD NETOPS hierarchy the AFNOSC represents a region level, tier 2, see Table 3.
The AFNOSC develops options and directs configuration and security posture changes in
response to vulnerabilities and incidents, Joint Task Force direction, and outages that
cross MAJCOMs, affect a majority of the AFEN or are time critical (DoA, 2004). The
AFNOSC directs the actions of subordinate NOSCs and NCCs when necessary.
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Air Force Network Operations Command Relationship
This section describes the command relationships established within the Air Force
to accomplish effective management of the AFEN, Figure 7, Air Force NETOPS
Command Relationships. Each entity plays a significant role in providing reliable,
secure, and on-demand communications services. The relationships help ensure global
systems interoperate without diminishing the authority of local commanders to direct and
manage assets under their control (DoAF, 2004b).
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Figure 7, Air Force NETOPS Command Relationships
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Eighth Air Force Commander
The Eighth Air Force Commander (8 AF/CC) is designated the NETOPS
commander and is responsible for NETOPS across the Air Force. MAJCOMs are
directly subordinate to Headquarters United States Air Force. However, the 8 AF/ CC
enforces compliance and has directive authority over MAJCOM units and assets.
Directive authority is delegated to the Eight Air Force Vice Commander, the AFNOSC
director.
Eighth Air Force Vice Commander
The Eighth Air Force Vice Commander (8 AF/CV) is the Commander of Air
Force Forces-Computer Network Operations and the director of the AFNOSC. The
commander ensures missions are performed in support of joint objectives and integrates
NETOPS and computer network defense functions across the AFEN. To ensure network
availability and security, the commander directs configuration and security posture
changes of NOSCs and NCCs in response to or in anticipation of events.
Air Force Network Operations and Security Center
The AFNOSC is the highest tier in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy. The
AFNOSC provides senior leaders with global visibility of AFEN resources, performs
system and network management, disseminates information, works with external
agencies to resolve Air Force network anomalies and directs AFEN operational, security,
and configuration changes (DoAF, 2004b). Personnel assigned to the AFNOSC provide
top-level technical assistance for IT professionals assigned to subordinate NOSC and
base NCCs. The AFNOSC has the following three divisions: Command and Control
(C2) division, Network Security division, and the Network operations division.
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Major Commands
In order to accomplish their portion of the Air Force mission, MAJCOMs must
maintain an effective and reliable network that provides communications services to
assigned bases and resources. Each of the eight MAJCOMs develops network
procedures, policies, and standards for subordinate units. Considerable coordination is
required to ensure interoperability and compatibility between MAJCOMs and across the
AFEN. Additionally, each MAJCOM maintains a NOSC to provide command and
control and NETOPS of their network assets.
Major Command Network Operations and Security Centers
The mid-level organization in the three level Air NETOPS hierarchy is the
MAJCOM NOSC. This organization is a critical link in the daily operation of the AFEN.
Personnel assigned to the MAJCOIM NOSC provide the commander with front-line
network intrusion defense and real-time visibility of assigned network resources
throughout the command. MAJCOM NOSC personnel also provide NCCs with fault
resolution support, engineering assistance, and visibility into NOSC managed devices.
The NOSC also provides systems control, maintenance, and administration functions of
the MAJCOM network (DoAF, 2004:22). For example, the Air Combat Command
(ACC), a large MAJCOM, NOSC manages one of the largest enterprises in the Air Force.
The ACC NOSC provides network services to more than 110,000 users located across the
command’s 15 Air Force bases (Mossing, 2004). The Air Force is currently transitioning
the focus for management of the AFEN from NCCs to NOSC. How this transition is
executed will determine if BANs are maintained to provide optimal performance, this
study provides foundation research.
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Network Control Centers
The NCC is the lowest level in the Air Force NETOPS hierarchy. They provide
Wing commanders with visibility and command and control of the fixed base network.
Personnel assigned to the NCC help achieve information assurance, oversee operation of
the network, and perform maintenance and management of the base network. The NCC
provides an on-site technical capability to make physical network changes, modifications,
and restoration of defective network transmission equipment and circuits when directed
by the MAJCOM NOSC or AFNOSC. Air Force NCCs are the heart of this research
study because they provide the first level of management for BANs. Regional control
and management of networks, the new Air Force position, seems well suited for
information assurance, update dissemination, and command and control. However, fault
resolution, quality of service, restoration of network transmission equipment may suffer
if regional and global tier technicians aren’t familiar with the BANs their responsible for
administrating. This research study attempts to determine if variation is present in BANs
throughout the Air Force and to explore the nature of any identified differences.

Clinger-Cohen Act and Strategic Visions that Shaped the Air Force Enterprise
Network
Overview
This section provides background information concerning the laws and strategic
visions that began the transformation of Air Force and DoD network architectures from
an assortment of vertical systems to an eventually robust and integrated critical weapons
system, see Table 4, Law/Vision Timeline. First, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 is
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discussed. Next, Joint Visions 2010 and 2020 are explored to provide a framework and
common point of reference for this research study. Finally, the DoD construct for
logically improving interoperability is introduced. This section highlights the importance
of information and networks, identifies the joint interoperability mandate source, outlines
the visions that initiated the DoD transformation, and provides a construct for improving
interoperability.
Table 4, Law/Vision Timeline

CLINGER COHEN ACT

1996

Clinger Cohen Act, Amendment 1998
Joint Vision 2010

July 1996

Joint Vision 2020

May 2000

Clinger-Cohen Act 1996
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 establishes and mandates the position of Chief
Information Officer (CIO) for federal departments and agencies. The act also sets
guidance for acquisition and management of information resources. An amendment to
the Clinger Cohen Act requires the following:
-

Establishment of IT standards throughout the Department of Defense

-

Elimination of duplicate information technology systems within and between
the military departments and Defense Agencies

-

Interoperability of IT and national security systems throughout the
Department of Defense
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The amendment assigned additional responsibilities to the Department of Defense
and Military Department CIOs (Public Law 105-261). The requirement to establish CIOs
did not outline how to implement the new positions. The military departments and the
Marine Corps, a division of the Navy, selected different avenues for establishing the
position of CIO. The Army and Marine Corps have military officers. Conversely, the
Navy and Air Force have civilians. Predictably, each service has distinct methods and
procedures for installing, operating, and maintaining their respective networks.
Joint Vision 2010
Joint Vision 2010, released in July 1996, had a profound impact on the
development of military capabilities by outlining an operational concept of joint
warfighting (Brewin, 1997). The doctrine provided a guiding template for the future
direction of warfare; standardization represents the heart of the Joint Vision 2010 (DoD,
2000a). The vision initiated the process of military transformation and established a
process for conducting joint experimentation and training (DoD 2000). The document
established a common framework and language for the services to develop and articulate
their contributions to the joint force and placed emphasis on the ability to disseminate
information quickly through networks (DoD, 2000). As a result, network-centric
warfare, “employing Information Age concepts to increase combat power in war and
mission effectiveness in operations other than war” (DoD, 2001:37), became a central
focus of military strategy. Information technology managers in all three services
believed in 1997 that the only way to transform network-centric warfare from a concept
into reality is through the development of cohesive base-level and shipboard networks
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rooted in commercial standards (Brewin, 1997). This research study will increase
understanding and focus attention on critical foundation level Air Force networks.

Joint Vision 2020
Joint Vision 2020 builds on the foundation established by Joint Vision 2010 and
provides the overarching strategic vision for the continued transformation of our military
services. This document is essential to this research study because it defines a future
information environment that fosters free and timely information sharing between all
DoD components. Base area networks, the focus of this study, provide the critical link
between local users and other MAJCOM, Air Force, and DoD assets. The updated vision
calls for significantly improved interoperability to provide joint force capabilities beyond
the simple combination of service capabilities. The document’s primary focus is full
spectrum dominance, the ability to operate alone or in combination with partners to
defeat any adversary and control any situation, achieved through the interdependent
application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full
dimensional protection (DoD, 2000, p. 6). Joint Vision 2020 identifies information
superiority as a key enabler in the transformation of operational joint force capabilities,
Figure 8, (Cohen, 1997).
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Figure 8, (Cohen, 1997)

Joint Vision 2020 also calls for the development of a Global Information Grid
(GIG); a seamless, common user, information infrastructure; for a detailed definition, to
provide the network-centric environment required to achieve information superiority
(DoD, 2000). Although the GIG alone does not guarantee interoperable DoD information
systems, the architecture makes significant progress by providing the missing enterprise
roadmap required for enabling interoperability among DoD systems (Miller, 2001).
Organizations, doctrine, and training must evolve to realize the full potential of Joint
Vision 2020, (DoD, 2000).
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Level of Information Systems Interoperability Model
Interoperability is a common theme found in the guidance provided by ClingerCohen, Joint Vision 2010, and Joint Vision 2020. The rapid evolution of information
technology enables the commercial industry to field products faster then the policy bodies
can prescribe standards (DoD, 1998). Ironically, the same advances that dramatically
enhance the inherent capabilities of information systems also compound the challenge to
field systems that are interoperable with each other at comparable levels of sophistication
(DoD, 1998). The Level of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model, Figure 9,
is used to increase integration and interoperability between DoD systems (Carney, 2004).
The model provides a common basis for logical and incremental improvement (DOD,
1998: ES-4). The LISI model was developed by the C4ISR universal reference resources
to define interoperability between information systems, provide a mechanism to measure
the maturity of information systems, and outline a way to proceed from one level to the
next (Clark, 1999). The LISI model complements other initiatives that support the
improved use of information system within the DoD, such as the Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII) Master Plan, DII Common Operating Environment, DoD Technical
Reference Model, and the Joint Technical Architecture (replaced by the DoD Information
technology Standards Register, DISR) (C4ISR, 1998).
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Figure 9, LISI model (DOD, 1998)

The model reflects five, zero thru four, increasing levels of sophistication
regarding system interaction, the ability of the system to exchange and share information
and services, and the associated computing environment; each higher level represents a
progressive and demonstrable increase in capabilities (DOD, 1998).
LISI Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and Data Model
Within the levels of the LISI model, many additional factors influence the ability
of information systems to interoperate. These factors are categorized into the following
four attributes and illustrated in Figure 10: Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and
Data (PAID) (DOD, 1998). Consideration and understanding the interrelationships
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between all PAID attributes is required to improve interoperability beyond the simple
connection of systems.

Figure 10, LISI PAID Model (DOD, 1998)

Alone, none of the PAID attributes sufficiently provides enough detail to
complete a meaningful definition of interoperability, but each represents a critical,
interdependent, and interlocking piece of the overall interoperability puzzle (DOD,
1998). Figure 11 demonstrates how the PAID attributes are used to describe and assess
levels of interoperability (DOD, 1998).
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Figure 11, PAID Attributes and Levels of Interoperability (C4ISR, 1998)

At each level of the LISI model, a word highlights the most import aspect of the
attributes. The significance and relative impact of each attribute will vary by level
(Clark, 1999). One attribute serves as the primary enabler for achieving the different
levels of interoperability (Clark, 1999). Table 5 illustrates the primary enabling attribute
for each level of the LISI model and provides a description of information exchange
taking place at each level.

36

Table 5, LISI Primary Enabling Attributes (Clark, 1999)

This study focuses on the infrastructure portion of the PAID model. Accordingly,
hardware, communications, and services are compared to determine if BANs are
different. Security is excluded because the CITS program effectively standardized a
major portion of security through boundary protection initiatives.

Organizations Affecting the Air Force Enterprise Network Structure
Overview
This section covers key positions or organizations that have an affect on the
AFEN, but were not previously covered in the preceding sections concerning the AFEN
network Architecture and Laws and Strategic Visions. Table 6 provides an overview of
the areas covered in this section.
Table 6, Section Overview

Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
Air Force Communications Agency
Deputy Chief of Staff/Warfighting Integration
Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics (HQ USAF/IL)
Defense Information Systems Agency
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Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
The Department of Defense (DoD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) implements
policies to advance interoperability and supportability of IT and National Security
Systems (NSS) throughout the DoD. This position highlights the importance on IT
within the DoD and facilitates conflict resolution by providing a higher level authority for
subordinate CIOs. The DoD CIO is responsible for the development, implementation,
and maintenance of the GIG as a sound integrated information technology architecture
and ensuring that the Defense Information Systems Agency works with other DoD
components to verify the interoperability and supportability of IT and NSS, (DoD, 2004).
Defense Information Systems Agency
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the DoD executive agent for
information standards; conducts interoperability assessment, test, and evaluations; and
the single integrator for joint, coalition, and combined command and control. The agency
ensures a link is maintained between published standards and the acquisition system. The
executive agent for information standards reduces redundancy by providing systems
engineering, planning, program guidance and interoperability testing for DoD
components. DISA provides the DoD with global classified and unclassified voice, data,
video, and transport services in manner that ensures US forces have access to
information, geography, and space (DISA, 2004). DISA also maintains the Defense
Information Technology Systems Registry (DISR) consisting of approved IT standards
and profiles to help acquisition and field interoperable and network-centric enabled
systems and products. The DISR provides mandatory standards and guidelines for the
management, development, and acquisition of new or improved IT systems; guidance is
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stable, technically mature, and publicly available. The DISR replaced the Joint Technical
Architecture and provides a basis for seamless interoperability (DoD, 2004a). The DISR
is also covered later in this chapter under the DOD guidance section.
Deputy Chief of Staff/Warfighting Integration
The Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Director of Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) Infostructure (HQ USAF/XIC) provides oversight of requirements, plans,
schedules, budgets, and performance criteria for Air Force communications and
information modernization efforts (USAF, 2004). This organization leads the
development and implementation of communications and information architectures and
represents the Air Force position for the development of joint architectures.
Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics (HQ USAF/IL)
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics, Directorate of
Communications Operations (HQ USAF/ILC) is responsible for communications and
information readiness and oversees the daily execution of Air Force communications and
information programs and processes. The directorate establishes course requirements and
planning guidance for the professional development, education, and training of the
communications and information workforce (USAF, 2004).
Air Force Communications Agency
The Air Force Communications Agency (AFCA) serves as the technical arm of
Headquarters United States Air Force (HQ USAF); ensures integration and
interoperability among command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems
(AFCA, 2004a). The agency acts as the policy and standards adjunct of HQ USAF and
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the Air Force CIO and develops service level agreements with external organizations
(USAF, 2004). AFCA administers the Air Force Operationalizing and Professionalizing
The Network (OPTN) program.
Operationalizing recognizes the network as a mission critical system with
operations that are fully integrated with mainstream Air Force processes.
Operationalizing requires applying operational rigor to establish an environment that
fosters mission readiness. Warfighting needs drive the core requirements for
operationalizing the network. Operationalizing involves the following five key elements:
readiness, inspections and evaluations, graduated response, operational reporting, and
rules of engagement (AFCA, 2004c).
Professionalizing the network is an operating approach that changes the way we
train, organize, and equip to match the disciplined approach used with weapons systems
that are more traditional. Protected and rigorously engineered interoperable networks
staffed by certified professionals can only satisfy the information requirements of Air
Force leaders. Standardizing Air Force network operations and management to align
with Joint network operations and management efforts will enable Air Force forces to
train as we fight (AFCA, 2004c). This is perspective succinctly describes the importance
of exploring the nature of Air Force BANs.
The agency ensures information infrastructure optimization by deploying strike
teams globally for assured Air Force network combat power. Strike teams either
augment base or NOSC personnel to reconstitute failed or falling networks and provide
targeted networking engineering expertise. Additionally, base assistance teams assess
compliance to standards and provide technical and optimization assistance. During the
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summer of 2004, AFCA changed the name and focus of their base assistance teams, from
SCOPE Network to SCOPE EDGE; both build on the Scope Creek concept employed
much earlier in Air Force history.
Scope Creek
In 1968, Project Scope Creek was the first large-scale, precise system analysis
conducted by highly skilled, specially trained engineers and Airmen (SCOPE EDGE,
2004). The exceptional success of Scope Creek led to its application in evaluating DoD
worldwide communications and a substantial growth in the Scope Creek workforce. By
the end of 1975, the workforce grew to 40 teams with a total of 231 personnel positions
(SCOPE EDGE, 2004). Eventually, the term “Scope Creek” became an Air Force figure
of speech meaning the systematic evaluation of a communications network (SCOPE
EDGE, 2004). The Scope Creek provided precision system analysis by expert
technicians. In 1997, AFCA resurrected the concept and applied it to modern technology
in a preventive maintenance and fine-tuning capacity under term SCOPE Network
(SCOPE EDGE, 2004).
SCOPE Network
From 1997 to the summer of 2004, AFCA SCOPE Network teams focused on
optimizing and securing existing network work equipment at Air Force installations to
achieve peak performance. Ten five-person SCOPE Network teams traveled to every
base in the Air Force every 18 to 24 months to perform the following tasks:
-

Tune base network for optimal performance
Enhance network security
Improve operations management
Train and mentor local information technology professionals
Identify and share best practices
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-

Respond to emergency situations, as required

SCOPE Network teams provided a valuable tool for that produced immediate
results. In worst-case scenarios, team members discovered and restored base networks
operating at one-tenth of capacity due to unnecessary software (Barry, 2001). The very
rapid deployment of Air Force networks through the 1980s and 1990s created the need
for SCOPE Network (SCOPE EDGE, 2004). Visiting locations on a yearly basis fostered
the development of sound local operating procedures and continued the Scope Creek
tradition of providing precision system analysis by expert technicians.
SCOPE EDGE
After several SCOPE Network visits, many bases improved to the point that
additional visits provided diminishing returns (SCOPE EDGE, 2004). Diminishing
returns and the reorganization AFCA resulted in a fundamental shift in the SCOPE
Network mission to support Air Force needs. In 2004, SCOPE Network evolved to
SCOPE EDGE in preparation for one of the largest overhauls of all Air Force networks in
decades (SCOPE EDGE, 2004). After the change, the network is viewed as an enterprise
instead of a collection of 130 separate bases (Hoeft, 2004). The EDGE in SCOPE EDGE
stands for Enterprise, Design, Guidance and Evaluation. SCOPE EDGE Teams continue
the tradition of providing a valuable service by focusing on the following four mission
areas: base compliance assessments, NOSC network optimization, fielding Strike Forces
to provide targeted network engineering expertise, and base optimization; a team is
assigned to visit each MAJCOM (Hoeft, 2004). Since evolving from SCOPE Network,
base assistance visits have been cut back from 120 visits in a 18 month period to 30 visits
in a 12 month period (SCOPE EDGE, 2004). Teams perform a detailed remote analysis
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before the actual visit to increase the value of time spent at the site. An authoritative
checklist is used to evaluate compliance with accepted architectures and standards. The
SCOPE EDGE capability ensures the AFEN is run with rigor and discipline, through
compliance assessment, while also addressing issues not covered by standards or policy,
through optimization visits (NOSC, 2004). Instead of mainly focusing on precision
system analysis like its predecessor, SCOPE EDGE focuses more on “standardizing Air
Force networks towards achieving a consistent, sustainable, and cost-effective
communications medium to support a seamless information grid”, (SCOPE EDGE,
2004).
Air Force Enterprise Network and Base Area Network Relevant Topics
Overview
This section covers areas relevant to the AFEN and BANs. Topics in this section
do not fit neatly into any of the proceeding sections; however, the topics provide essential
information covering the following: Combat Information Transport System, Defense
Information Technology Systems Registry, Global Information Grid, Air Force
Instructions, Open Systems Strategy, and the Defense Standardization Program.
Combat Information Transport System
The Combat Information Transport Systems is a $4.7 billion HQ USAF level
program for the acquisition, sustainment, implementation, and upgrade of high speed,
broadband, and digital information transport assets that provide inter-base connectivity
linking in-garrison command and control and combat support systems to the DoD
Information Systems Network (Horn, 2004). The centers of gravity for the CITS
program are network connectivity, information assurance, asset management,
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interoperability, and standard interfaces to joint service networks. The program identifies
BANs as a key enabler of the development of a DoD global communications network and
a vital link between home base resources and warfighters deployed abroad (CITS, 2004).
The Air Force Communications Agency administers the CITS program.
The CITS program is charged with ensuring every active duty and reserve base
has a BAN, referred to as Information Transport System by CITS, which links existing
and future voice, data, video, imagery, and sensory systems. The program provides full
network interconnection to core buildings and backbone capacity capable of handling
future, non-core building requirements. The CITS program fields new capabilities using
a block numbering system. Specifically, an odd numbered block signifies a NOSC
focused capability and an even numbered block signifies an NCC focused capability.
Block 30 of the CITS program is designed to replace the aging network equipment on
bases, standardize architectures, and move security boundaries from bases to NOSC
(Horn, 2004). Additionally, Block 30 will allow for commonality of architecture,
equipment, and training (GD, 2003). The CITS program management office provides
specific, technical installation and implementation direction for BANs at each base.
These directions are divided into the following three parts: network, distribution systems,
and internal wiring from the communications closet to the end user equipment (CITS,
2004).
Defense Information Technology Systems Registry (DISR)
Department of Defense Directive 4630.5 and DoD Instruction 4630.8 establish
responsibilities of CIOs and other components. The documents define a capabilityfocused, effects-based approach to information technology and national security system
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interoperability and supportability across the DoD. These directives mandate the joint
technology leveraged foresight of Joint Visions 2010 and 2020. This guidance requires
the leaders of DoD components to ensure use and implementation of approved standards
contained in a consolidated standards repository, the DISR, previously covered in this
chapter under the DISA section. The DISR replaced the Joint Technical Architecture; a
document that defined the service areas, interfaces, and standards applicable to all DoD
systems. The instruction requires the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency to
maintain the DISR, provide online access to the registry, and ensure the standards
registry is linked to the acquisition system (DoD, 2004). Information previously found in
the Joint Technical Architecture makes up the backend database for web-based DISR
applications (DISRonline, 2004). The guidelines and standards found in the DISR are
technically mature, stable, and publicly available at http://disronlin.disa.mil/
(DISRonline, 2004).
Global Information Grid
The Global Information Grid (GIG) called for in Joint Vision 2020 is the
foundation for achieving information superiority by providing enterprise wide
information services for DoD command and control, communications computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and e-business systems. To provide
interoperability, the GIG construct requires the integration of systems adhering to open
systems standards. When fully implemented the GIG provides a net-centric, globally
focused information environment that facilitates information sharing among people,
sensors, and weapon platforms (DoD, 2003). The GiG provides capabilities from all
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operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, and mobile platforms) and
provides interfaces to coalition allied, and non-DoD users and systems (DoD, 2003:7).
Air Force Instructions
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-133, Joint Technical Architecture-Air Force (JTAAF), tailors and refines core standards defined in the DoD Joint Technical Architecture.
This instruction provides additional standards, standard profiles, recommended products,
information technology architectures, and guidance not included in the DoD JTA (DoAF,
2000). An updated AFI referencing the DISR, replaced the DoD JTA needs to be
published.
Air Force Instruction 33-115, Volume 3, implements Air Force Network
Operating Instructions (AFNOI), directive guidance network managers use during daily
operations to maintain network software and equipment. The AFNOIs provide detailed
procedures and checklist for operating network components and responding to specific
events (DoAF, 2004). These instructions provide a flexible vehicle for providing
standardized directive guidance to practitioners in the field.
Air Force Instruction 33-115, Volume 1, Network Operations, provides the
policy, direction, and structure of the AFEN. The instruction implements the AFNOSC
reporting structure and provides the guidance necessary to manage the increasingly
complex network environment to provide a cohesive Air Force network. This AFI
assigns responsibilities from the AF CIO down to the local base units.
Open Systems Approach to Weapon System Acquisition
The open systems strategy employs modular design tenets and uses widely
supported and consensus based standards for key interfaces to develop an affordable and
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adaptable information system (DAG, 2004). Under the open systems initiative,
equipment is not standardized, but a standard information architecture and standard cable
attachments are required to permit interfacing with existing equipment (DoD, 2000a:22).
The open systems strategy offers tremendous flexibility by providing a standardized
“plug and play” capability among physical and electronic interfaces, while allowing
equipment upgrades to keep pace with technological advances (DoD, 2000a). This
approach supports achieving the following four benefits: 1) reduced acquisition cycle
time and overall life-cycle cost, 2) ability to insert cutting edge technology as it evolves,
3) commonality and reuse of components among systems, 4) increased ability to leverage
commercial investment (DoD, 2000a).
The Open System Joint Task Force (OSJTF) was chartered as a cooperative effort
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense with the
purpose to sponsor and accelerate the adoption of an open system approach for new
systems and system upgrades (DLA, 2004). The OSJTF does not attempt to dictate the
use of common hardware everywhere; the task force seeks to standardize to each unique
need while retaining the advantages of common architecture and major interfaces (DLA,
2004).
Defense Standardization Program
The Defense Standardization Program (DSP) is conducted under the statutory
provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain a standardization program for
the following areas of focus (DoD, 2000a):
1. Standardizing like procedures and technologies
2. Using a common set of specifications and standards
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3. Cooperating with industry in the development of standards
4. Assigning standardization responsibilities in the DoD
5. Resolving disputes between the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
6. Making final decisions in all DSP-related matters
This research is primarily concerned with areas 1 and 2 above. Standardization is
an enabling strategy for achieving the Joint Vision goals to provide the warfighter with
interoperable, reliable, and technologically superior equipment (DoD, 2000a:10).
Interoperability, information superiority, and the rapid application of new technology
represent key areas of the Joint Vision doctrine and depend on standardization to be
successful (DoD, 2000a). The goals of the DSP are (DoD, 2000a):
1. Improve military operational readiness by achieving interoperability,
improving logistical support, improving reliability, and modernizing
existing systems.
2. Reduce costs by reducing number of nonstandard parts, facilitating
competition, promoting use of common process and open systems,
promoting standard commercial processes and practices, reducing training
costs, and reaching a consensus on requirements to optimize systems
engineering.
3. Reduce replenishment cycle time by using standard items and identifying
interchangeability and interoperability requirements to facilitate the rapid
introduction of new technologies.
The DSP concedes that standardization is not always desirable. It may not be
practical or desirable to standardize when the technology involved is rapidly evolving and
acquiring the desirable state-of-the-art solution or items go out of production after a short
period of time (DoD, 2000a). This describes the nature of BANs and information
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technology components. In these instances, it may be beneficial to standardize interfaces
or protocols by pursuing an open systems strategy (DoD, 2000a).
Chapter Summary
Chapter II presented a literature review of topics related and important to whether
the Air Force should standardize BANs at installations across the service, the topic of this
research project. The literature review established a framework and common perspective
for this research project.
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III. Methodology

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the process used to answer the research and investigative
questions, presented in chapter I of this research study. This chapter discusses the
qualitative research approach, role of the researcher, rationale for selecting the case study
methodology, case study research design, quality of the research design, data collection,
data analysis, and research limitations. This research project uses a multiple site case
study methodology to examine Air Force BANs. Documented base assistance team visits
and focused interviews provide the data for analysis.
Qualitative Approach
The qualitative study is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human
problem conducted in a natural setting (Creswell, 1994). The following three factors
determine the appropriate research approach: research problem, personal experiences of
the researcher, and the audience (Creswell, 2003:22). The qualitative approach is
appropriate to investigate exploratory research problems by researchers with experience
in literary writing and intending to present their results to practitioners (Creswell, 2003).
In this study, the research problem is exploratory, the researcher has experience in
literary writing, and the target audience is practitioners in the field of information
technology.
In addition to the guidance provided by Creswell, other researchers provide
parameters for selecting the qualitative approach. According to Leedy, a case study is a
type of qualitative research in which information is gathered about a single or multiple
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cases to learn more about an unknown or poorly understood state of affairs (Leedy,
2001). Yin offers, case studies investigate contemporary problems within real-life
context to account for pertinent influences on the research topic (Yin, 1994). This study
examines the little understood topic of Air Force BANs, a contemporary problem, in a
natural environment. According to “Moores Law”; named after Gordon Moore, a cofounder of the computer chip maker Intel; available computing power doubles every 18
months, (Intel, 2004). Rapid changes in technology, AFEN size, and decentralized
growth across the Air Force contribute to the current lack of understanding BANs. The
goal of this research is to add to the body of knowledge concerning Air Force BANs by
examining existing literature and documented visits to three separate locations and
interviewing information technology professionals.
Role of the Researcher
The qualitative researcher’s sustained involvement with participants introduces a
range of strategic, ethical, and personal issues into the research process. Researchers
should explicitly identify their biases, values, and personal interests about their research
topic, including past experiences that enable the audience to better understand the topic,
setting, or participants (Creswell, 2003:184). To improve quality, use your own prior
expert knowledge in your case study (Yin, 2003:137). The researcher has twelve years
experience working in various base level communications positions at four different
locations. He managed the infrastructure element of a base NCC on an installation
visited by an Air Force Communications Agency base assistance team; the team provided
significant technical support and guidance for future enhancements. The researcher does
not have a direct connection or previous experience with any of the three documented trip
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report locations examined in this study. The researcher is believes the current move
towards regional control and network management of Air Force networks lacks adequate
attention on local level support. Failing to address this concern may lead to extended
outages, derogated service, interrupted information sharing, and ultimately prevent
mission accomplishment.
Case Study Rationale
This study uses the case study strategy and focused interviews. The case study is
especially suitable for learning more about a poorly understood situation (Leedy, 2001).
Use the case study strategy when the research satisfies the following three conditions: the
research questions must be in the form of how or why, the researcher must not have any
control over events, and the study must focus on a contemporary event or problem (Yin,
1994). This study fulfills all three conditions. The investigative questions are in the
required form, the research investigates an exploratory question about a contemporary
problem, and the researcher has no control over the events. The documented base
assistance team visits were conducted prior to the start of this research. The following
three sections detail how this research study satisfies the conditions cited in this
paragraph and listed in Table 7.
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Table 7, Strategy for Research Design (Yin, 1994)

Form of Research Question
Research questions take one of the five following basic forms: how, why, what,
who, and where (Yin, 1994). The first three forms apply to this research and support the
case study strategy. Research questions taking the form of how and why are explanatory
and support using the case study, historical and experimental research strategies (Yin,
1994). Research questions in the form of what are either exploratory or prevalence and
support all of the strategies or surveys and archival analysis, respectively (Yin, 1994).
Whom and where research questions support strategies other than case study, as reflected
in Table 7. The investigative questions used to address the main research question in this
study are in the form of how, why, and the exploratory what.
Extent of Control
Lack of researcher control over events is an important characteristic of case study
research; see Table 7, (Yin, 1994). This study uses previously completed base assistance
team reports, focused interview transcripts, and a review of existing literature. Therefore,
the study satisfies the case study extent of control guidelines. Additionally, interviewees
reviewed transcripts for accuracy and correct interpretation.
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Focus
Case study is the preferred research strategy when asking how and why questions,
the researcher has little control over events, and the focus is on a contemporary rather
than a historical issue (Yin, 1994:1). Case study data collection methods include the
following: interviews, documentation, and observations (Leedy, 2001:157). In this
research study; the research questions are in a favorable format, the focuses is on a
contemporary Air Force problem, and the data collection methods include documentation
and interviews.
Research Design
The research design is the logical sequence that ties the research data to the initial
research questions and, eventually, to the conclusions of the study (Yin, 1994:19). The
design determines what questions to study, what information is relevant, what to collect,
and how to analyze the research results (Yin, 1994:20). An exploratory case study should
define what is explored, the purpose of the exploration, and the criteria used to determine
if the exploration is successful (Yin, 1994:29). This study explores BANs on established
Air Force bases. The purpose of this exploration is to provide leaders and managers with
sound information for making current and future BAN related decisions. This
exploration is successful if it addresses the research propositions, facilitates greater
understanding, and generates interest for additional research. The following five research
design components are particularly important to the case study research strategy:
research questions, research propositions, units of analysis, logic linking between data
and research propositions, and criteria for interpreting the results (Yin, 1994:20).
Sections below reflect how this study addresses each component.
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Research Questions
This section outlines the main research question, investigative questions, and
research propositions, originally introduced in Chapter I. A latter section of this chapter,
the Data Collection section, contains the interview questions.
Main Research Question
Should the Air Force Standardize Base Area Networks?
Investigative Questions
6. Are BANs different throughout the Air Force? If so, how?
7. Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force?
8. What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force?
9. What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force?
10. How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs?

Research Propositions and Model
4. Research will show BANs are different throughout the Air Force
5. Research will identify sources of disparate Air Force BANs.
6. Research will show advantages and disadvantages of disparate Air Force
BANs.
7. Research will identify an appropriate AF response to current state of BANs.
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BANs?
Disadvantages
of Variability
Figure 12, Research Model

Research Procedures
This section illustrates the procedures used to answer each research question. The
answer to the main research question is inferred by reviewing answers to each of the
investigative questions. The first investigative question is the linchpin of the study. In
order to answer this key question, documentation in the Base Assistance Team site report
for each location and information obtained during interviews are compared base on the
infrastructure attribute of the LISI model, introduced in chapter II. The table below
identifies how each investigative research question is addressed. Interview questions are
listed later in this chapter under the Data Collection section.
Table 8, Research Procedures

Investigate Question
1

Method of address

3

AFCA Base Assistance Team (BAT) Trip Report, Interview
Question 1, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature Review.
Interview Questions 3 and 4, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature
Review
Interview Question 6 and Cross Case Analysis

4

Interview Question 5 and Cross Case Analysis

5

Interview Question 7, Cross Case Analysis, and Literature Review

2
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Unit of Analysis
Accurately specifying the primary research questions facilitates selecting the
appropriate unit of analysis (Yin, 1994:23). The unit of analysis determines what the
“case” is (Yin, 1994:21). Fixed BANs at established Air Force installations are the units
of analysis for this study, not deployable or contingency networks. Key participants
include personnel assigned to the local Network Control Center on each installation.
Logic Linking of Data to Propositions
Interpreting data in terms of common themes and synthesizing data into an overall
portrait of the cases are methods of processing case study information (Leedy, 2001:157).
“Pattern-matching”, linking information from cases to propositions, is a promising
method of linking case study data to the research propositions (Yin, 1994:25). This study
examines information from each case to identify support or lack of support for each
research proposition. Cross-case analysis is used to identify any similarities, differences
and common themes.
Criteria for Interpreting Results
Analyzing case study evidence is one of the least developed and most difficult
aspects of conducting case study research (Yin, 2003). The following three general
analytic strategies and five specific techniques can be used to process case study evidence
(Yin, 2003):
General Analytic Strategies
- Relying on theoretical propositions
- Setting up a framework based on rival explanations
- Developing case Descriptions
Specific Analytic Techniques
- Pattern matching
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-

Explanation building
Time-series analysis
Logic models
Cross-case synthesis

The analytic strategy sets the priority for what to analyze and why (Yin, 2003).
This study relies on theoretic propositions, pattern matching, and cross-case synthesis to
analyze evidence. The theoretic propositions; Air Force BANs are disparate, sources of
disparity, and advantages and disadvantages of disparity; form the general analytic
strategy. The specific analytic techniques used are pattern matching and cross-case
synthesis. Theoretic propositions and the Level of Information System Interoperability
(LISI) model provided data collection parameters. Specifically, locations are compared
for variability based on the range of considerations associated with the infrastructure
attribute of the LISI model, see the LISI sub-section of Ch II for a detailed explanation.
Quality of Research Design
The following four tests determine the quality of any case study research effort:
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 1994:33).
Table 9, summarizes the tests and tactics used to satisfy research design requirements
during various phases. The four subsequent sections address how each test is satisfied in
this research study.
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Table 9. Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Yin, 1994:33)
Tests
Construct validity

Case Study Tactic
• Use multiple sources of evidence
• Establish chain of evidence

Phase of research in
which tactic occurs
data collection
data collection

• Have key informants review draft case
study report
Internal validity

• Do pattern-matching
• Do explanation-building
• Address rival explanations
• Use logic models

External validity

• Use theory in single-case studies
• Use replication logic in multiple-case
studies

Reliability

• Use case study protocol
• Develop case study database

data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
data analysis
research design
research design

data collection
data collection

Construct Validity
The first test, construct validity, consists of establishing the correct operational
measures for the investigated concepts and is especially problematic in case study
research. Case study critics point to the fact that investigators fail to sufficiently develop
an operational set of measures and that subjective judgments are used to collect data
(Yin, 1994:34). Table 9 lists the following three tactics for increasing construct validity:
multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence, and key informant review
(Yin, 2003:34). This study employs all three tactics. Multiple cases and focused
interview transcripts provide multiple sources of evidence. The researcher received
documentation, trip reports, directly from the Air Force Communications Agency and
documented interview transcripts to establish a chain of evidence. Key informants,
practitioners working in base level communications positions, reviewed the case study
report and interviewees reviewed interview transcripts for accuracy and correct
interpretation.

59

Internal Validity
The second test, internal validity, involves establishing causal relationships,
certain conditions lead to other conditions. This type of logic is inapplicable to
descriptive or exploratory studies (Yin, 1994:35). Internal validity for case study
research extends to the bigger problem of making inferences; is the evidence convergent
and are the inferences correct (Yin, 1994)? Table 9 identifies the following four tactics
for increasing internal validity: pattern matching, explanation building, address rival
explanations, and logic models. This research study uses pattern matching.
External Validity
The third test, external validity, deals with knowing whether a study’s findings are
applicable beyond the immediate case study, replication (Yin, 1994). Table 9 identifies
theory in single case studies and replication logic in multiple-case studies as tactics for
increasing external validity. This research examines multiple cases by exploring BANs
at five locations, three with documented trip reports and two where key informants are
currently stationed. Accordingly, replication logic is used to increase external validity.
Key informant interviews, outside the three select trip report locations, were conducted to
improve the overall applicability of results.
Reliability
The forth and final test, reliability, deals with demonstrating the operations of a
study are repeatable and will provide the same results and conclusions if a subsequent
investigator follows the same procedures in conducting the same case study (Yin,
1994:36). The goal of reliability is to minimize the biases and errors in a research study
(Yin, 1994:36). Table 9 reflects the following two tactics for increasing reliability: use

60

of a case study protocol and development of case study database. In this study,
documenting research procedures is used to increase reliability.
Data Collection
In qualitative research, purposeful selection of participants or sites provides the
best opportunity for the researcher to address the research questions (Creswell,
2003:185). This logic is in contrast to random sampling or the selection of a large number
of participants typically found in quantitative research (Creswell, 2003). This
exploratory inquiry uses documentation specifically focused on BANs and focused
interviews of personnel with practical experience in base level communications.
Qualitative data collection steps include setting the boundaries of the study,
collecting information through unstructured (or semi-structured) observations and
interviews, documents, and visual materials (Creswell, 2003). This study uses
documentation and focused interviews for data collection. Five personnel at each of the
documented trip report locations are interviewed as well as key informants at two other
locations. Only personnel with networking experience at more than one location will be
interviewed. Air Force Communications Agency, base assistance team, final trip reports
are the form of documentation used. The following semi-structured interview questions
address the research questions and propositions:
1. Are base area networks throughout the Air Force the same or different? Support
for your reply?
2. The Air Force CIO, Mr. John Gilligan, created the Standards Council to help
reduce the variability found in base area network architectures throughout the Air
Force. Do you think base area networks should look the same or similar? Why or
why not?
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3. What do you feel are the primary reasons base area networks across the Air Force
are configured, arranged, and equipped differently?
4. Why is there so much variation concerning base area networks throughout the Air
Force?
5. What are the advantages of employing a variety of network architectures at bases
throughout the Air Force?
6. What problems are created by employing a variety of network architectures at
bases throughout the Air Force?
7. How do you think the Air Force should respond to the current state of base area
networks?

Pilot interviews resulted in the creation of interview question one to directly
addresses whether BAN architectures are different throughout the Air Force. Previously,
the researcher assumed they were different based on personal experience. In contrast,
some pilot interviewees believed BANs are relatively the same or didn’t know.
Question Development
The main research question, investigative questions, and the research propositions
were used to develop the interview questions. Interview questions were developed to
ensure collected data adequately covered the research objectives. Table 10, identifies
how each interview question is related to a research question or proposition.
Table 10, Interview Question Development

Interview
Question
1
2 and 7
3 and 4
5
6

Supported Investigative
Question(s)
Investigative 1
Investigative 5
Investigative 2
Investigative 4
Investigative 3
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Supported Proposition(s)
1
4
2
3
3

Interview question number 1 supports the first investigative question and the first
research proposition by revealing the interviewee’s view on the whether BANs
throughout the Air Force are disparate, or not. This question was not included in the
initial interview questions; it was added after several test interviews.
Interview questions 2 and 7 solicit input concerning what should be done about
disparate Air Force BANs to address the fifth investigative question and the fourth
research proposition. These questions were developed based on input from test
interviews. Interview question 2 establishes the interviewee’s position on the desirability
of standard networks. Question 7 asks what should be done about the current state of
BANs, regardless of whether the interviewee believes them to be disparate or not.
Interview questions 3 and 4 support the second investigative question and the
second research proposition by attempting to identify sources of BAN variation.
Question 3 constrains the inquiry to configuration, arrangement, and equipment.
Question 4 employs no limitation and is designed to capture a broader range of responses.
Interview question five addresses the fourth investigative question and the third
research proposition by identifying the advantages of variety. This question is the polar
opposite of interview question 6.
Interview question 6 supports the third investigative question and the third
research proposition by identifying problems encountered due to variation in BANs
throughout the Air Force. Interviewees were encouraged to include any experiences
prior to their current duty assignment.
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Key informant feedback led to the development of interview question 1, 4, and 7.
Question 1 and 7 help address the fifth investigative question more directly and question
4 provides an additional opportunity to capture data for investigative question 2 and
proposition number 2. Practitioners assigned to an NCC not included in this research
study reviewed the interview questions and provided input for restructuring questions.
Responses to the interview questions reflect the views of seasoned professionals
responsible for maintaining Air Force BANs during at least two assignments.
Pre-interview Procedures
The nature of the topic restricted the pool of potential interviewees to individuals
having knowledge of BANs. Accordingly, the researcher interviewed personnel working
at base NCCs. To reduce any bias, interviewees were not told the nature or goal of the
study. Participation in this study is voluntary and anonymous. Interview questions were
provided to participants at least 24 hours in advance. Each participant signed the
informed consent letter prior to the start of the interview and provided an email address to
facilitate review and approval of their responses. Any requested modifications received
via the email feedback loop were accomplished before any answers were analyzed.
Participants were offered a copy of the final report.
Data Analysis
Data analysis involves examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise
processing the evidence to address the initial research propositions of the study (Yin,
1994:102). The following two general strategies help investigators choose among
different techniques and to complete the analytic research phase successfully: relying on
theoretical propositions and developing a case description (Yin, 1994:103). Within the
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general strategy, the following four analytic techniques should be used: pattern
matching, explanation building, time series analysis, and program logic (Yin, 1994:102).
A fifth technique, cross-case synthesis, applies specifically to analyzing multiple cases;
having more than two cases strengthens the findings much more than if produced by one
case (Yin, 2004:133). This research study relies on theoretical propositions for the
general analytic strategy and pattern matching and cross-case synthesis as the specific
techniques.
Theoretical Propositions
Theoretical propositions help to focus attention on certain information and to
ignore other information (Yin, 1994:104). The propositions introduced in Chapter 1 and
earlier in this chapter shaped the data collection and analysis of this research project. The
purpose of this study is to increase existing knowledge concerning BANs. The
theoretical propositions directed the exploration of BANs with a focus on key areas.
Pattern Matching
Pattern matching, comparing a empirically based pattern with a predicted pattern,
is one of the most desirable case study analysis strategies (Yin, 1994:106). This study
compares patterns from multiple cases and focused interviews. The details of the
comparison are included in chapter IV.
Key Informant Review
Interviewees reviewed transcripts prior to data analysis. Key informants reviewed
the case study for validity and logic. The key informant review increased the internal
validity and reliability of this research effort.
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Cross-case Synthesis
Five sites are compared during this research study. Three cases have documented
trip reports and two locations where selected because they are the current duty stations of
key informants. Locations are compared based on the range of considerations associated
with the infrastructure attribute of the LISI model. Additionally, interview responses are
compared across locations.
Research Limitations
There are several limiting factors for this research study. First, the size of the
AFEN is a limiting factor. The Air Force has at least a semi-permanent communications
presence at over 120 locations worldwide. This study examines BANs at five locations
in detail to find indicators that apply to the larger AFEN. Sites were selected with
diversity in mind and include the following: Air National Guard Base, Oversea
installation, and continental United States bases. Second, little research exists on the
specific area of BANs. As a result, there is not much to build upon. Third, the fluid
nature of information technology poses a significant hurdle for conducting research; the
information technology environment changes rapidly. Fourth, this study will not produce
results comparing similar locations; this is an opportunity for additional research. Fifth,
Time represents the final major limitation of this study. The importance and complexity
of this study demand more time than this effort can provide. Despite these limitations,
this research makes a contribution to current understanding. This study aims to establish
grounds for additional research.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the process used to answer the research questions
presented in Chapter I of this research study. This chapter discussed the qualitative
research approach, role of the researcher, rationale for selecting the case study
methodology, case study research design, quality of the research design, data collection,
data analysis, and research limitations.
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IV. Analysis

Chapter Overview
This chapter provides the results of the exploratory research methodology
outlined in Chapter III. The research model, figure 13, represents the logical map
followed in attaining the results; convergent sources of information were used. The
results are based on documented AFCA SCOPE Network Reports, focused interviews of
network professionals, and a detailed literature review. This chapter is presented in five
primary sections. First, support for conducting this research effort is presented. Second,
the case study report section describes the sites included in this study. Third, an
overview of the interview data is presented. Fourth, each investigative question is
answered and summarized. Fifth, the main research question is addressed. A total of five
sites are used in this study to address five investigative questions and answer the main
research question; documented trip reports were available for three locations and focused
interviews were completed at four locations.

Variable

Advantages
of Variability
Why

AF
Response

BANs?
Disadvantages
of Variability

Figure 13, Research Model
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Support for Conducting Current Research
As an initial step in the interview process, question two was asked and analyzed.
Responses were split pretty evenly regarding whether interviewees BANs should be the
same or similar across the Air Force; results indicate a lack of a clear consensus among
practitioners.
Interview Question 2
•

The Air Force CIO, Mr. John Gilligan, created the Standards Council to help
reduce the variability found in base area network architectures throughout the
Air Force. Do you think BANs should look the same or similar? Why or why
not?

Fifty seven percent of the interviewees spread over three locations stated BANs
should be the same, four out of seven. Forty-three percent, three of seven, all from site
two said BANs should be similar but not the same. Even though clear preference didn’t
emerge from the raw results, all three very experienced key informants and the most
experienced non-key informant think BANs should look the same. The personnel
interviewed at site two, reported BANs should be similar, are the least experienced in the
pool of interviewed personnel, see Table 13 Interview Demographics. Table 11 provides
a complete summary of interview question two responses. Some thoughts from the
majority that think BANs should be the same are listed below:
•
•

•
•

Need a common NCC solution for core services
Common baseline infrastructure solution that is developed, funded, and
implemented from the highest level
o This concept allows knowledge gained at one base to be directly
applicable to other bases
AF should franchise the process of providing communications and network
services. Would easily provide NOSC with site specific base configurations
Approval for exceptions should be centrally managed
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The minority who feel BANs should look similar shared a rationale centered on
the concept of security through diversity. They feel that disparate BANs increase
security by making it more difficult for intruders to gain unauthorized access. After
completing this initial step, further research is clearly justified.
Table 11, Interview Question 2 Response Summary

Response Summary
Questions 2
Same
Similar

# of
Individuals
4
3

Interviewee(s)
3, K1, K2, K3
2A, 2B, 2C

% of
Individuals
57
43

# of
Sites
3
1

Site Descriptions
This section provides a description of the five sites selected for this exploratory
research project. Purposeful selection of participants or sites provides the best
opportunity for the researcher to address the research questions (Creswell, 2003:185). A
desire to better understand BANs, a very scarcely researched topic, influenced site
selection. Sites 1 through 3 were selected for this study because the sponsoring agency
provided documented trip reports and the sites provide good examples of current
installations according to network size; small, medium, and slightly large. Two
additional trip reports were provided by the sponsoring agency for locations with small
networks; these sites were not selected for this study because the researcher did not want
to over influence the results with small network characteristics. Sites 4 and 5 were
selected because the three key informants used in this study are currently stationed at
either Site 4 or Site 5. The sites used in this study include four locations in the
continental United States and one overseas location; at least one Air National Guard base
is included. Information reflected in this section is based on SCOPE Network trip reports
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to Sites 1 thru 3 in calendar year 2003 and focused interviews of personnel at four of the
five locations, Site 1 personnel were not interviewed. The BANs at the sites are
maintained by military, government civilians, and contract personnel.
Site 1
Site 1 has approximately 2,000 user accounts and a vendor A provided
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) backbone with vendor B distribution switches.
Servers running Window NT 4.0 provide network services, with two DNS Windows 2K
servers. The NT architecture is a multiple master domain model. The NCC controlled
domain has a two-way trust with an external agency. This relationship allows the
external agency to control accounts and access to the network. This is not a desirable
configuration and the NCC is working to remove the external domain. Personnel from
Site 1 were not interviewed.
Site 2
Site 2 has approximately 4,000 user accounts. The ATM backbone network
consists of vendor C switches with two primary vendor C switch routers. The access
layer, first 400 feet to the user, is primarily comprised of vendor C routers. Network
services are provided by a Windows NT, Hybrid Single Master Domain architecture with
five trusting resource domains. Three personnel from Site 2 were interviewed for this
research project.
Site 3
Site 3 has approximately 300 user accounts and the base backbone is a large flat
network with all users, servers, and infrastructure equipment in the same broadcast
domain. The backbone consists of vendor C switches. Distribution layer switches also
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serve as access layer switches. Network services are provided by a Single Master
Windows NT domain with a one-way trust with an external entity. One person from Site
3 was interviewed for this research project.
Site 4
Site 4 has approximately 5,500 users, uses a Gigabit Ethernet backbone, and
operates primarily vendor C equipment. Unlike the first three sites, documented trip
reports to this location were not available. Site 4 is included in this study because two
key informants are currently stationed at this location. Site specific information was
obtained during interviews.
Site 5
Site 5 has approximately 6,000 users, has a Gigabit Ethernet backbone, and
operates all vendor C equipment. A documented trip report was not available for this
location. This site is included because it is the current duty station of the most
experienced key informant. Site specific information was obtained from the interviewed
informant.
The comparison matrix below compares the five sites used in this study. The
matrix identifies differences in the type of network backbone, type of hardware, and
method of providing network services via the type of Windows NT architecture
employed. All of the sites, except Site 1, use vendor C equipment.
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Table 12, Site Comparison Matrix

Locatio
n

Network
Type

Hardware

Network
Services

Trip
Report

Interviews
(Number)

Site 1

Approximate
Number of
Users
2,000

ATM

Vendor A
and B

Yes

No

Site 2

4,000

ATM

Vendor C

Yes

Yes (3)

Site 3

280

Flat

Vendor C

Yes

Yes (1)

Site 4
Site 5

5,500
6,000

Gig E
Gig E

Vendor C
Vendor C

Multiple Master
Windows NT
Architecture
Hybrid Single
Master Windows
NT Architecture
Single Master
Windows NT
Architecture
unknown
unknown

No
No

Yes (2)
Yes (1)

Interview Data
Network Control Center leadership at Sites 2 and 3 identified personnel with
enough knowledge concerning the base network and the larger AFEN to make a
contribution to this study. Additionally, each interviewee was asked to refer someone
they thought could contribute. The goal established in Chapter III to interview at least
five people at each of the locations was not met do to one of the following reasons: not
enough people working in the NCC processed knowledge beyond their assigned task
(bigger picture perspective), individuals weren’t willing to participate, or NCC leadership
did not approve interview request. Despite these obstacles, personnel from four of the
five locations were interviewed. A total of seven interviews were conducted for this
study. Four interviews were conducted at locations with documented trip reports, three at
Site 2 and one at Site 3. Network Control Center management at Site 1 did not approve
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the request to interview personnel. Three key informant interviews were conducted, two
at Site 4 and one at a Site 5, see the Interview Demographics table below.
Table 13, Interview Demographics

Location

Interviewee

Site 2
Site 2
Site 2
Site 3
Site 4
Site 4
Site 5

2A
2B
2C
3
K1
K2
K3

Networking
Experience (Yrs)
4.5
3
4
9
8
11
17

Multiple
Locations
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Employee
Grade
SrA
SrA
SSgt
Contractor
SSgt
MSgt
MSgt

The attempt to only interview personnel with at least network management
experience at two different Air Force locations was not successful. At each location, the
majority of personnel working in the NCCs only had experience with their current
network. However, some had several years experience and were informed of other
networks through conversations and interactions with other network professionals
assigned to other bases. Key informant interviews from two locations increase the
external validity and construct validity of the study.
All key informants possessed experience with multiple networks at multiple
locations and at least eight years of networking experience. Although the target interview
pool of 15 personnel at the first three locations did not materialize, the interview results
are insightful and add value to the current body of knowledge. It was very difficult to
locate personnel with enough networking experience, were willing to participate, had the
time to be interviewed, and management granted access to, despite only having seven
interview questions.
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Investigative Questions
This section addresses each of the five investigative questions in separate
subsections. In each subsection, the evidence is presented in the following sections, if
applicable: document trip report information, interview data with select excerpts, and a
summary of convergent information.
Investigative Question One
•

Are BANs different throughout the Air Force? If so, how?

The results of this study indicate BANs are different throughout the Air Force
based on comparing documented trip reports, analyzing interview results, and reviewing
existing literature. In this study, sites are compared according to the range of
considerations under the infrastructure attribute of the LISI model, see Figure 14. The
infrastructure attribute defines the range of components that enable interactions between
systems including hardware, communications and networks, system services, and security
(C4ISR, 1998). This range of considerations minus security is used to determine if
BANs at the five locations included in this study are different. Security is excluded
because the CITS program has effectively standardized a major portion of this area.
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Figure 14, Paid Paradigm Reflecting Range of Considerations for Each Attribute

Trip Report
The comparison matrix, Table 12, developed from documented Base Assistance
Team (BAT) trip reports and focused interviews reflect differences in the three areas of
interest: network type, hardware employed, and method for providing network services.
The hardware area reflects the least amount of difference; four of five sites use vendor C
equipment.
Interview Question 1
•

Are base area networks throughout the Air Force the same or different? Support
for your reply?

76

Responses to this question substantially supported the thought that BANs are
different. Six out of seven interviewees stated that BANs are different, 86 percent, and
one individual didn’t know if they were different or not because he has only worked at
one base, 14 percent. Interviewees at each of the four possible locations believe BANs
are different, see Table 14 for a summary of responses by location. Two individuals
mention similarities and differences present among some BANs. After discussing their
responses further, they made it clear they believe the network architectures are different.
Not one individual reported that BANs are the same. The following statements were
taken from interviews:
•
•
•
•
•
•

“Due mostly to working topologies and network saturation varying from base to
base. Also if they were the same the AF wouldn’t be sending out teams to
standardize”
Too much freedom is given at each base for the local commander to determine
what can and can't be done on the network. “When the risks are explained to
them, the response is one of indifference, as long as they get what they want”.
Different bases stood up campus networks at different times
Funding has been haphazard at times; sometimes from the base, MAJCOM, AF,
DOD, etc
Design decision making has been managed very differently at times by the AF
engineers out of Tinker AFB
“Home grown solutions, implemented "on the cheap" at times, developed by local
"experts". I myself have been the guilty party of more than one of these local
incarnations”
Table 14, Interview Question 1 Response Summary

Response Summary
Questions 1
Different
Don't Know

Interviewee(s)
2B, 2C, 3, K1, K2,K3
2A

# of
Individuals
6
1

% of
Individuals
86
14

# of
Sites
4
1

Literature Review
An Air Force Education and Training Command briefing, for senior leaders,
describes BANs as independent networks and a smorgasbord of hardware (AETC, 2003).
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The briefing clearly articulates the problem and level of attention the situation has
grasped. Additionally, Block 30 of the CITS program provides an opportunity to
establish common architectures, equipment, and training for BANs (Horn, 2004). These
sources provide further evidence that BANs are different.
Investigative Question One Results Summary
Convergent evidence is provided to support the believe that BANs are different
throughout the Air Force. First, the comparison matrix identified differences in three of
the four areas identified in the PAID paradigm of the LISI model in Figure 14. Second,
the responses to interview question one align with the documentation in providing
support that BANs are different. Third, information from the literature provides
additional support that BANs are different; specifically, a briefing for senior Air Force
leaders and goals of Block 30 of the CITS program.
Investigative Question Two
•

Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air Force?

Nine different reasons for variety were found during the course of this research.
Interview questions three and four, cross case analysis, and existing literature were used
to answer investigative question two. Interview question three was designed to solicit the
primary reason for differences and question four was designed to gather additional
reasons for variation. However, only two additional responses were given to question
four, the other responses were excluded because they duplicated responses provided for
question three, see Table 15.
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Interview Questions 3 and 4
•

What do you feel are the primary reasons base area networks across the Air
Force are configured, arranged, and equipped differently?

•

Why is there so much variation concerning base area networks throughout the
Air Force?

Decentralized decision authorities is the primary reason interviewees gave for
BANs being configured, arranged, and equipped differently across the Air Force. Three
interviewees at two different locations gave this response, including two very
knowledgeable key informants; 43 percent of all interviewees.
The next significantly contributing factor is different funding avenues available
for different bases. Two very knowledgeable key informants located at different bases
reported this response, 29 percent. Different missions and security by being different was
also reported by 29 percent of the interviewed pool. However, these two responses were
reported by two individuals at the same locations, see Table 15. The following
statements were taken from interview transcripts:
•

•
•
•

“Since there is no single focal point setting the rules, local commanders are
free to do what they want at each base. They are allowed to spend base funds
upgrading infrastructure, hardware and software, as well as determining what
they will and won't allow on an AF network”. What was acceptable locally
before may not be acceptable for the larger enterprise.
Different channels available for funding IT at each base and different support
contracts
Timing, MAJCOM program management office (PMO) focus at the times of
implementation created different technological pursuits
Inconsistent solutions coming from the engineers at Tinker AFB and the CITS
PMO
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Table 15, Interview Question 3 and 4 Response Summary

Primary Reason for Difference, Q3
Decentralized decision authorities
Different funding avenues
Different Missions
Security by being different
Networks evolved at various times
Implementing locally developed technical
solutions
MAJCOMs not on the same page
Inconsistent solutions from levels above base

Why is there so much variation, Q4
Base level decision authorities lack knowledge
No idea

Interviewee(s)
3,K1,K2
K1,K3
2A,2B
2B,2C,
K3
K3
K3
K3
Interviewee
K2
2C

# of
Individuals
3
2
2
2
1

% of
Individuals
43%
29%
29%
29%
14%

# of
Sites
2
2
1
1
1

1
1
1
# of
Individuals
1
1

14%
14%
14%
% of
Individuals
14%
14%

1
1
1
# of
Sites
1
1

Literature Review
Existing literature supports the top interview responses. The Air Force network
operations hierarchy was designed to provide command relationships that ensured global
systems interoperate without diminishing the authority of the local commanders to direct
and manage the information technology assets under their control (DoAF, 2004).
However, these relationships generated often conflicting and incompatible guidance. The
recent consolidation of three Air Force headquarters directorates into a single directorate
responsible for networks and warfighter integration acknowledges the need for change
and provides a solution (SAF, 2004). This move should streamline policy development
and enforcement. Additionally, new DoD instructions require DISA to be involved in the
development and operational testing of information technology assets (DoD, 2004b).
Some of the replies to this question were reported at only one site or by one individual,
but existing literature provides another source of support; see Table 16, Triangulated
Response Summary. Triangulation is a major strength of the case study methodology;
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most importantly it establishes converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003:98). First, each
BAN is made up of existing and new components configured as a consolidated network
(CITS, 2004). As such, each is tailored to provide for the various mission of each
installation. Second, the combination of BANs that make up the AFEN evolved over
time with explosive growth (DoAF, 2004). During the 80s and 90s technology grew
faster than regulatory guidance could be published. As a result, locally developed
solutions were common. The responses listed in the Triangulated response table below
provide convincing evidence because they are corroborated by multiple sources of data.
Table 16, Triangulated Response Summary

Primary Reason for
Difference, Q3
Decentralized decision
authorities
Different funding avenues
Different Missions
Networks evolved at various
times
Implementing locally
developed tech solutions

Interviewee(s)

# of
Individuals

% of
Individuals

# of
Sites

Lit
Review

3,K1,K2
K1,K3
2A,2B

3
2
2

43%
29%
29%

2
2
1

Yes
Yes
Yes

K3

1

14%

1

Yes

K3

1

14%

1

Yes

Investigative Question Two Results Summary
In summary of the results for investigative question two, not one particular reason
received was reported by a majority of interviewees. However, the triangulated
responses, identified in the table above, provide the most convincing evidence for why a
variety of BANs are currently in use throughout the Air Force. The top reported reason
for variation is decentralized decision authorities with different funding avenues and
different missions placing second and third, respectively. The responses that are not
triangulated provide good insight and should also be investigated further, see Table 17.
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Table 17, Single Source Response Summary

Primary Reason for
Difference, Q3
Security by being different
MAJCOMs not on the
same page
Inconsistent solutions
from levels above base

Why is there so much
variation, Q4
Base level Decision
authorities lack
knowledge

Interviewee
2B,2C,

# of
Individuals
2

% of
Individuals
29%

# of
Sites
1

Lit
Review
No

K3

1

14%

1

No

K3

1

14%

1

No

Interviewee

# of
Individuals

% of
Individuals

# of
Sites

Lit
Review

K2

1

14%

1

No

Investigative Question Three
•

What problems are created by using a variety of BANs throughout the Air
Force?

A range of nine problems were identified, from training to preventing
standardization. The third investigative question is answered by responses to interview
question six and a cross case analysis of these responses.
Interview Question 6
•

Interview question six is identical to investigative question three.

Training difficulties was significantly reported as a problem created by using a
variety of BANs throughout the Air Force. Five out of a possible seven interviewees
sited training as a problem, 71 percent. All of the very experienced key informants
reported training as a problem. Interviews from each of the four locations used in this
study reported training as a problem. Difficulty in troubleshooting problems is the
second most significantly reported problem created by employing a variety of BANs
throughout the Air Force. Three individuals at three separate locations reported
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troubleshooting as a problem, 43 percent. Difficulty in this area can lead to denial of
service for users and adversely affect mission accomplishment, the third most
significantly reported problem. Adverse impact on mission accomplishment is the third
most significantly reported problem, but is the most important of the reported problems
because training and troubleshooting problems have a direct impact on mission
accomplishment. This problem is reported by three people covering two different
locations, 43 percent. Adding to the significant of this problem is the fact that it is
reported by all three of the experienced key informants. The rest of the reported
problems are identified in Table 18 below and provide important insight from
practitioners that maintain and support BANs on a daily basis. Examples of training
problems reported during interviews are listed below:
•
•
•

“Every time a technician moves to a new base they not only have to learn the
new network layout, there is a high probability that the will have to learn a
completely new vendor's equipment”
“When I get a new technician from Tech School, I pretty much know what
level of experience I will be getting. But when I get an "experienced" NCO
inbound, I really have no idea what equipment that they will be familiar with”.
An experienced technician recently arrived to an installation that uses vendor
B equipment with a Gigabit Ethernet backbone with network switches. The
technician is trained on vendor B equipment routers using an ATM backbone.
He has a skill that will never be use at his current base.
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Table 18, Interview Question 6 Response Summary

Problems caused by
variety of BANS, Q6
Training Difficulties
Difficulty troubleshooting
problems
Adverse impact on
mission accomplishment
Continuity
Interoperability
Complicates planning for
future
Lost hours due to class
attendance
Multiple approval levels
Prevents standardization

Interviewee(s)
2C, 3, K1, K2, K3

# of Individuals
5

% of Individuals
71

# of Sites
4

2A, 3, K1,

3

43

3

K1, K2, K3
2C, K1
K1, K2

3
2
2

43
29
29

2
2
1

K2

1

14

1

K3
K2
2B

1
1
1

14
14
14

1
1
1

Investigative Question Three Results Summary
In summary of the answers to investigative question three, training was the most
significantly reported problem, followed by, troubleshooting difficulty and adverse
impact on mission accomplishment. Adverse impact on mission accomplishment is the
most critical of the reported problems because problems with training and difficulty in
troubleshooting will adversely impact mission accomplishment. The actions of the key
informants is noteworthy in this section. The key informants all reported training
difficulties and adverse impact on mission accomplishment. Surprisingly, only one key
informant reported difficulty in troubleshooting. Difficulties with training were reported
by personnel at all of the interviewed sites, Site 1 personnel were not interviewed.
Troubleshooting difficulty was reported by personnel from three sites and adverse impact
on mission accomplishment was reported by personnel at two of the four locations
including all three key informants.
Investigative Question Four
•

What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force?
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The following four replies were identified by interviewees: security through
diversity, variety of training opportunities, tailoring to specific needs, and no advantage.
Investigative question four is answered by responses to interview question five and a
cross case analysis of the responses.
Interview Question 5
Interview question five is the same as investigative question four. Security
through diversity was the most significantly reported advantage of using a variety of
BANs. This advantage was reported by four out of seven people, 57 percent, covering all
four locations used in this study. Reporting individuals believe a variety of network
architectures increases the difficulty in hacking into Air Force systems and limits the
impact of equipment specific vulnerabilities or design flaws. They fear that standard
networks would be less secure because once a hacker gained access to one network it
may be possible to gain access to other networks using similar techniques. Diversity also
protects against vulnerabilities designed for a particular vendor’s line of equipment or
software. Providing a variety of training opportunities is the second most significantly
reported advantage. Three out of seven reported it, 43 percent, covering two of the four
sites used in this study. Table 19, located below, provides a complete summary of the
advantages reported. None of the reported advantages was reported by more than one of
the experienced key informants. The following statements are excerpts from the
interviews:
•
•

Need to understand that some standardization is needed, but for major security
issues such as viruses not all bases can be the same; too much standardization
makes it easier for hackers break into multiple networks
If a network incident takes down one network, it may not affect all networks
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•
•
•
•
•

“A single vendor supplying all of the equipment for the AF going out of business
would be catastrophic”
A common vulnerability and/or failure prone to a particular piece of equipment
would only affect locations that use the equipment
Helps to see different network architectures, in regards to troubleshooting and just
basic network knowledge; the more variety the better your technicians are going
to be
“Broad training opportunities and cost savings by just buying what is needed
instead of purchasing a standard package that provides more capability than
required”
None, - UPS has a standard architecture across the globe, why can’t we emulate
their process?
Table 19, Interview Question 5 Response Summary

Advantages created by a
variety of BANs, Q5
Security through diversity
Variety of training opportunities
Tailoring to specific needs
No advantage

Interviewee(s)
2B, 2C, 3, K3
2B, 2C, K1
2A, K1
K2

# of
Individuals
4
3
2
1

% of
Individuals
57
43
29
14

# of
Sites
4
2
2
1

Investigative Question Four Results Summary
The results of investigative question four identified three advantages. Security
through diversity was the top reported advantage, reported by 57 percent. Variety of
training opportunities was reported by 43 percent of the interviewees and tailoring to
specific needs was reported by 29 percent.
Investigative Question Five
•

How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs?
Investigative question five identifies potential responses to the current state of

BANs. This investigative question is answered by interview question seven, cross case
analysis of responses, and a review of existing literature. The interview results show a
slight majority in support of developing standard baseline architectures and
implementation plans to correct disparate BANs throughout the Air Force. Existing
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literature compliments the interview data by promoting the open systems strategy over
attempting to standardize equipment everywhere, especially when the in question is
rapidly evolving.
Interview Question 7
•

How do you think the Air Force should respond to the current state of base area
networks?
Fifty-seven percent of interviewed personnel believe developing standard baseline

architectures and a prioritized implementation plan is the best way to deal with the
current state of BANs. This slight majority consists of four out of seven people from
three of the four interviewed locations. The three experienced key informants are in
agreement. Responses below the top response were not reported by more than one
interviewee, no agreement is reached on any other response; each response below the top
response represents fourteen percent of interviewed personnel. Table 20 provides a
complete summary of responses to interview question seven. The following comments
were reported during interviews:
•
•
•
•

“Develop model and strategic plan for standardizing to 1 AF network with central
approval (remove lower levels from approval process)”
“Institute baseline architectures, regardless of MAJCOM and put the horse before
the cart and implement Tech School and follow on classes to support the new
baselines, BEFORE THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED.”
Secure data by responding to weaknesses first, backdoors and vulnerabilities.
Work gradually towards a standard network AF wide
Top down implementation plan, based on the number of users at a base. Much
like CITS has done with its NO/IA equipment. Each base gets x number of
servers to support users, a couple of file servers, anti-virus servers, email, domain
controllers, and a network backup solution that will handle a tape backup of
critical systems. “The base would not be allowed to add to or change this setup
without justification and approval from the top.” Publish directives stating how
much email space, and server space each user is allotted, and have consequences
for commanders that try to change things without approval.
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Table 20, Interview Question 7 Response Summary

Response Summary Question 7,
Response to Disparate BANs

Interviewee(s)

# of
Individuals

% of
Individuals

# of
Sites

3,K1,K2,K3

4

57

3

2b

1

14

1

Standardize from lowest level up

2c

1

14

1

Standardize from top down

3

1

14

1

Publish required standards

3

1

14

1

Don't Know

2a

1

14

1

Develop standard baseline architectures
and a prioritized implementation plan
(secure vulnerabilities first, other areas
through attrition)
NOSC and Base Technicians work better
together

Literature Review
Existing literature under the standardization body of knowledge supports caution
in attempting to standardize volatile technology. In attempting to improve
standardization, the Defense Standardization Program (DSP) guidance acknowledges that
it may not be practical or desirable to standardize when technology is rapidly evolving or
the desired solution or items go out of production after a short period (DoD, 2000a). This
is extremely applicable to Air Force BANs. According to the updated version of Moore’s
Law, computing power doubles every 18 months and is expected to maintain this course
for at least two more decades (Intel, 2004). Before 130 locations could be equipped and
installed with the same suite of equipment, replacement technology for locations
receiving the initial install would be required. In these instances, the DSP suggest
employing standard interfaces or protocols provided under the open systems strategy
(DoD, 2000a).
The open systems strategy promotes modular design tenets and widely supported
and consensus based standards for key interfaces to develop affordable and adaptable
information systems (DAG, 2004). Under this strategy, tremendous flexibility is offered
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by providing a standardized “plug and play” capability among physical and electronic
interfaces, while allowing equipment upgrades to keep pace with technological advances
(DoD, 2000a). The Open System Joint Task Force (OSJTF), a chartered and cooperative
effort of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
seeks to sponsor and accelerate the adoption of an open system approach for new systems
and system upgrades within DoD (DLA, 2004). Instead of attempting to dictate the use
of common hardware everywhere, the task force seeks to standardize according to each
unique need while retaining the advantages of common architecture and compatible
major interfaces (DLA, 2004).
The Defense Information System Agency maintains the DISR, a consolidated
standards registry that replaced the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA). This registry is
available on-line and identifies interfaces and standards that are technically mature and
stable (DoD 2004). Although DoD guidance requires all components to use and
implement the standards identified in the registry, Air Force level guidance is not
available. Air Force guidance does exist on the Air Force JTA, but the DoD JTA has
been replaced by the DISR.
Investigative Question Five Results Summary
Investigative question five results consist of a range of six different responses
recorded during focused interviews and information retrieved from existing literature. Of
the six recorded interview responses, developing and implementing standard baseline
architectures was reported by fifty-seven percent of interviewed personnel; no other
response was reported by more than one individual; interview data is supported by
literature. Existing literature finds standardization in the technology arena is not always
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beneficial especially when the technology is rapidly evolving or items remain in
production for short periods of time, as is the case with networking equipment. The
literature also supports modular design tenets and the use of consensus based standards
for key interfaces instead of attempting to standardize equipment everywhere.
Additionally, Air Force guidance on concerning the DoD consolidated registry, DISR, is
needed.
Main Research Question
•

Should the Air Force Standardize Base Area Networks?

Yes, the results of five investigative questions support the development and
funding of standard baseline architectures from a high level in the department of the Air
Force; reducing lower levels removes opportunities to deviate from accepted standards.
Existing literature reveals the existence of a DoD composite repository of standards and a
Joint Task Force for accelerating the adoption of open systems practices. However, Air
Force guidance is not currently available.
The main research question is answered by the results of the five investigative
questions. To address investigative question one, documented trip reports, interview data
and existing literature established that BANs are different throughout the Air Force.
To address investigative question two, interview data and existing literature
identified the following nine reasons for variation in Air Force BANs: decentralized
decision authorities, different funding avenues for bases, different missions, networks
evolved at different times, implementing locally developed technical solutions, security
by being different, MAJCOMs not being on the same page, inconsistent solutions from
levels above the base, and base-level decision authorities lacking knowledge to make
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network architecture decisions. The first five are supported by multiple sources of
information and are the most significant sources of variation.
To address investigative question three, interview data identified the following
nine problems created by employing a variety of BANs throughout the Air Froce:
training difficulties, troubleshooting problems, adverse impact on mission
accomplishment, continuity problems, interoperability concerns, planning for the future,
lost hours, multiple approval levels, and prevent standardization. The first four were
reported by multiple individuals at more than on location and represent the most
significant problems caused by using a variety of BANs.
To address investigative question number four, interview data identified the
following three advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the Air Force:
security through diversity, variety of training opportunities, and tailoring to specific
needs. Each response was reported by multiple individuals at more than one location.
To address investigative question number five, interview data and existing
literature to identify how the Air Force should respond to the current state of BANs.
Interview data supports the development of standard baseline architectures to address
varying situations at different locations. Existing literature supports adhering to the open
systems strategy of concentrating on major interfaces and consensus based standards. A
mechanism, the DISR, to support this line of action is established and reinforced by the
creation of the Joint Force Task Force to help accelerate the adoption of open systems
practices; however, Air Force guidance is not available at this time. Table 21 illustrates
how the research model presented in the overview section of this chapter, Figure 13, is
followed to answer the main research question.
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Table 21, Main Research Question Evidence Summary

Research Stage
Are BANs
different
Reasons for
Differences

Disadvantages of
Variability

Advantages of
Variability

How Should AF
Respond to current
BANs

Should AF
standardize BANS

Research Results
Trip reports, interview results, and existing literature provide
evidence that BANs are different
Interview data and existing research identified the following nine
reasons for variation:
- Decentralized decision authorities
- Different funding avenues
- Different missions
- Networks evolved at various times
- Implementing locally developed tech solutions
- Security by being different
- MAJCOMs not on the same page
- Inconsistent solutions from levels above base
- Base level decision makers lack knowledge
Interview data identified the following nine problems created by
using a variety of BANs:
- Training difficulties
- Difficulty troubleshooting problems
- Adverse impact on mission accomplishment
- Continuity
- Interoperability
- Complicates planning for future
- Lost hours due to class attendance
- Multiple approval levels
- Prevents standardization
Interview data identified the following three advantages of using a
variety of BANs:
- Security through diversity
- Variety of training opportunities
- Tailoring to specific needs
Interview data promoted establishing baseline architectures to
address different situations at bases
Existing literature supported following the open systems strategy to
ensure the compatibility of key interfaces instead of attempting to
standardize equipment everywhere
Investigative question results indicate YES, by adhering to the open
systems strategy to provide baseline architectures for BANs

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results of the exploratory research methodology
outlined in Chapter III. Documented AFCA SCOPE Network trip reports, focused
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interviews, and a detailed literature review were used to provide convergent sources of
information for reaching the presented results. A total of five sites were used in this
study to address five investigative questions and ultimately answer the main research
question; documented trip reports were available for three locations and focused
interviews were completed at four locations.
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V. Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations

Overview
The purpose of this exploratory research of Air Force BANs was to increase
understanding and establish points of interest for further investigation. Documented trip
reports, interview transcripts, and existing literature provided evidence that BANs are
different throughout the Air Force, identified nine reasons for variation, identified nine
disadvantages and three advantages of employing a variety of BANs, and recommended
an Air Force response to the current state of disparate BANs. A comparison of interview
data and documented trip reports covering five locations provided these results. This
chapter discusses the interviewees; research results, implications, and recommendation;
suggestions for future research; and a conclusion. In parallel to this research, Lieutenant
Jamie Sharkey conducted a thesis on the key issues pertaining to Air Force enterprise
architecture management.
Discussion of Interviewees
Research participants were purposefully selected based on their knowledge and
experience in BANs. Accordingly, even the responses reported from only one individual
at one location provide key insight. Comparing responses from several sites increases the
external validity by identifying repeated responses; however, all responses, repeated or
not, provide valuable insight. Participants in this study urged their support for any effort
to reduce the amount of variation that currently exists in our BANs across the Air Force.
Members firmly believe there must be a better way to operate. Frustrations stem from
investing energy into developing technical capabilities only to have those capabilities
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relegated to a hobby upon reassignment to a new location. Training new personnel
provides an additional source of frustration. New NCC personnel face a steep learning
curve; this isn’t peculiar to information technology career fields. However, rapidly
changing technology, a salient characteristic of these career fields, results in a shortage of
experienced trainers in the field and attendance at off-site classes reduces the available
workforce and compounds the problem of providing quality base level communications
support. Experienced personnel declined to participate because they simply did not have
time.
Discussion of Research Results

The research results provide a unique and rich perspective by documenting input
from informed practitioners tasked to maintain and support BANs on a daily basis and
coupling these insights with information provided by existing literature. Increased
information demands, mandates for interoperability, rapidly changing technology, and
guidance from multiple sources continue to complicate the daily challenge of providing
reliable and effective communications to the right person, at the right time, and in the
right format. The results provide signposts for improving our current capabilities and
identifying potential pitfalls. Developing solutions for issues identified in this section is
not enough; perception changing strategies are required.
Procedures, an attribute of the LISI model, emerged as a common theme in the
research results. This attribute is the primary enabler for the highest level of
interoperability in the LISI model, the enterprise level or level four. This highest level of
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interoperability is needed to fully implement the GIG. The levels and their associated
primary enablers are reflected in Table 22.
Table 22, LISI Primary Enabling Attributes (Clark, 1999)

As networks and computer systems evolve and mature up through the levels,
different attributes act as key enablers. Ironically, infrastructure, used in this research as
a comparison construct, is the primary enabler at the very low level of peer-to-peer
interoperability and procedures is at the top level of interoperability. According to the
LISI model, effective management and coordination of information technology related
procedures and practices across the Air Force would enable interoperability at the
Enterprise level. However, networks must mature through the lower levels first by
fostering and developing the key enablers for each level; applications, data, and
procedures, respectively.
Should BANs look the same or different?
Initial inspection of the interview results shows an even split, no consensus,
between the choice of same or different. Upon further review, a clear demarcation exists
between practitioners with over eight years experience and those with less than five years
experience; more experienced practitioners believe networks should look the same. The
researcher believes the primary reason for the distribution of the results is experienced
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personnel have a better understanding of the obstacles encountered when attempting to
maintain, support, and connect disparate systems and networks.
The implications of these findings indicate a lack of consensus, either way, on this
issue and provide evidence that additional research, education, and information
dissemination is needed to help personnel work effectively towards a common goal of
leveraging information and technology to increase interoperability and integration, as
outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Recommend implementing information sharing initiatives
through NOSCs or adding education sessions to AFCA base assistance visits to share
policy, best practices, and disseminate information concerning the road ahead.
Are BANs different throughout the Air Force?
This study used an established construct, infrastructure element of the LISI
model, to compare sites; the results strongly indicate BANs are different. This finding
does not ignore the similarities that are present; instead it highlights the presence of major
differences. The U.S. Code Title 10 provides a structured and disciplined approach to
mission accomplishment by requiring the Armed Forces to organize, train, and equip
their respective forces. Air Force disparate networks severely degrade the service’s
ability to satisfy the fundamental Title 10 requirements. As a direct result, mission
effectiveness is decreased. Disparate networks make it more difficult to achieve
information superiority and integration. In order to provide reliable access to needed
information; the cables, systems, and networks must be effectively organized, controlled,
and managed. Standardized architectures for unclassified and classified networks are a
top level requirement of the CITS Block 30 initiative; however, this initiative is still in
development.
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Inherent differences in bases due to missions, terrain, or other environmental
factors present a formidable challenge; however, a better job must be done in providing
standardized base level communications. Capitalizing on the similarities is essential;
standard networks can be developed for the finite categories all bases fall into.
Implementing standard processes, procedures, and best practices for common tasks would
greatly simplify BAN management and network operations.
Implications of these findings indicate BANs are different and work is required to
ensure information technology assets are used more effectively to achieve the vision
outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Recommend enforcing standard processes, procedures,
and best practices for common task across the Air Force to reduce redundancy and sitespecific solutions for functions performed at multiple locations.
Why are a variety of BANs currently in use throughout the Air
Force?
All of the results for this investigative question stem from the previous Air Force
focus for managing networks; centered on the NCC at each location. This arrangement
worked well in the initial stages of network development during the 1980s and 1990s
because mature enterprise guidance was not available. The importance of information
and the role of the networks have evolved along with the DoD doctrine that now requires
interoperability, integration, and global access to achieve decision superiority. Mature
enterprise guidance is now available and the focus for managing networks has moved
from individual NCCs to NOSCs; a more centralized approach. The recent
announcement of plans to consolidate three headquarters organizations into a single
directorate responsible for networks and warfighting integration is a clear sign Air Force
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leadership acknowledges the need for a fundamental change in managing information
technology assets; consolidation plans will change the Air Force CIO from a civilian
position to a three star general (SECAF, 2004).
Implications of the research results reflect a major milestone in the development
of BANs. The structure and focus for managing these critical assets is in transition.
Centralized management and control are definitely a step in the right direction. Base
level networks are no longer just base assets. Operating globally deployed unmanned
aerial vehicles from stateside locations, warfighters accessing home station technical or
support data from austere locations, and providing video conferencing between family
and deployed military members are just a few examples of current reachback
applications; the future holds additional applications. Base are networks play a pivotal
role in the defense of our nation and should be managed at higher levels commensurate
with their overall contribution to the fight; previous paradigms and delineation points are
not useful. Policy should originate at the highest levels and get implemented across
traditional barriers of commands and bases to achieve maximum benefit for the Air Force
as a whole. Shortening the kill chain, introduced in the Research Significance section of
Chapter I, requires all phases of the AFEN and GIG; including BANs, to achieve the
optimal effects needed to defeat future adversaries and challenges. In spite of policy
originated at a macro level and a big picture mission focus, support and quality of service
for users at the lowest level must remain top priorities. Service to base level users
represents the critical link between warfighters and technology and has a direct impact on
mission accomplishment. Diligence is required to minimize the effects of any negative
unintended consequences. Recommend the development of transition strategies for

99

initial stages and initiatives to foster very close relationships between NOSC and NCC
personnel to overcome barriers associated with fault isolation and repair from a distance.
Additionally, recommend monitoring the quality of service and amount of down time
following the transition to SCOPE EDGE to determine if the reduction in base assistance
team visits from 120 visits in 18 months to 30 visits in 12 months will have a detrimental
effect.
What problems are created by using various BANs throughout the
Air Force?
The results identified by this investigative question are related to maintaining
BANs and the consequences of failing to maintain them. Problems satisfying two of the
Title 10 responsibilities, training and equipping, were addressed by the results of this
investigative question. Differences in network equipment, processes, and systems require
a unique and complex training program to provide instruction over a wide range of
diverse situations. The differences also reduce the size and composition of the
knowledge base for developing experts. As a result of increased variation, many small
and specialized groups form instead of fewer but larger groups of experts that improve
capabilities through increased opportunities to share information and lessons learned.
Administering such a training program is very difficult and time consuming; equipping
largely diversified networks is equally difficult.
Implications of these results suggestion widespread problems in training exist and
acquisition reform is needed to provide common equipment for practitioners. The $5
billion dollars in required network upgrades, estimated by the Air Force, to implement
Joint Vision 2020 are wasted if personnel are not trained to maintain the developed
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networks. Providing common equipment will positively impact current training
problems. Block 30 of the CITS program incorporates vendor selection and will help
reduce some variation. Recommend modifying the technical school training curriculums
to reflect the use of commercial off the self products. For information technology related
career fields, the bulk the technical instruction should come from commercial agencies.
Attempting to maintain current lesson plans in Air Force operated classrooms providing
technical instruction is a futile attempt to hold on a obsolete paradigm. Reducing
variation reduces the amount of different items required to perform the similar functions,
significantly reduces the logistics footprint required to support these items, and will aid
the development of effective training programs. Additionally, disparate networks make it
more difficult to find or use spare parts when needed.
What are the advantages of using a variety of BANs throughout the
Air Force?
The results of this investigative question reveal security through diversity and the
variety of training opportunities as the most advantageous benefits; only three benefits
were identified compared to nine reported problems or disadvantages from the results of
the previous investigative question. Training is identified as a problem and a benefit.
Security through diversity is seen as a benefit because current security practices are
ineffective; conveys a lack of confidence. Attempting to develop and implement
effective security patches and procedures for the vast equipment configurations
comprising our networks is very complex; however, the diversity does eliminate single
points of failure concerning specific equipment or software.
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Implications of these research results indicate a need to determine if the benefits
of security through diversity are stronger than the potentially improved security that can
be achieved by quickly monitoring and updating a less diverse suite of equipment and
software; the researcher strongly believes greater security benefits are provided by
effectively managing less diversity. The benefits obtained through security by diversity
are minimized by the other problems identified by the previous investigative question.
Recommend promoting security successes or capabilities to increase confidence and
promoting opportunities to fine tune networking skills by concentrating on a reduced
number of equipment and applications; quality over quantity.
How should the Air Force respond to the current state of BANs?
Results of this investigative question dismiss the idea of attempting to standardize
equipment everywhere throughout the Air Force. Instead, the results promote the
development of baseline architectures to exploit the benefits of the opens systems
strategy for interoperability and following the guidelines of the Defense Standardization
program. Additionally, results identified a gap in Air Force guidance concerning the
DoD consolidated standards registry, DISR.
Implications of these results show practitioners are in tune with current strategies
for improving standardization and identify a need to publish Air Force guidance
concerning linking Air Force initiatives with DoD efforts and guidance, specifically the
DISR. Recommend publishing guidance and promoting the use of the registry in
developing and obtaining future networks, systems, and equipment.
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Suggested Future Research

This section outlines opportunities for future research. First, duplicate this study
using locations with similar sized BANS to determine if the results are complimentary.
Comparing similar sized BANs will determine if identified variation and results are
unique to this study. Second, repeat this study using observations instead of documented
reports or interviews to eliminate any bias introduce by the authors of the documented
trip reports. Third, investigate how many practitioners develop skills that are applicable
at one location, but not used at subsequent duty assignments. Research will determine if
selective assignment procedures are needed for technicians with specialized skill sets.
Fourth, conduct surveys using this studies research results to explore support for sources
of variation, problems and advantages of variation, and proposed the Air Force response
to the current state of BANs. Fifth, perform similar study using commercial or
government agencies to determine if similar results are achieved; the banking industry
has security requirements similar to the military and could provide useful information.
Conclusion
This study concludes that the Air Force should standardize BANs in accordance
with principles of the open systems approach to weapons systems acquisition and fund
implementation from the highest level. In coming to this conclusion several important
issues were uncovered. First, additional research is required concerning BANs and to tap
the knowledge of current practitioners; virtually nothing has been published in this area.
Second, the shift to a more centralized approach to managing Air Force networks is a
significant development that should be monitored closely for unintended consequences.
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Fourth, coordinating Air Force information technology procedures and practices are key
enablers for achieving the enterprise level interoperability required to implement the
GIG; considerable attention should be applied to controlling practices in order to fully
exploit advantages provided by technology. Implementing more standardization will
make it possible to manage BANs and the AFEN more effectively, improve training,
reduce the length of outages, enhance interoperability, aid integration efforts,
significantly increase operational capability, and leverage technology to help implement
Joint Vision 2020.
This research provides leaders and managers with insightful information
concerning BANs and successfully contributes to the existing body of knowledge by
identifying differences in Air Force BANs, discovering sources of differences, revealing
advantages and disadvantages of variety, providing a recommended response to the
current state of BANs, and pinpointing additional areas for study.
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